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1485 
COURT-MANDATED STORY TIME: THE VICTIM 
NARRATIVE IN U.S. ASYLUM LAW 
This much we know: stories can change people‟s minds.1 
INTRODUCTION 
In the late 2000s and early 2010s, anti-immigrant rhetoric rose on a tide 
of fears about the U.S. economy.
2
 Nativist narratives inspired by rising 
unemployment dominated an increasingly antagonistic debate about U.S. 
immigration policy.
3
 Restrictive state laws, most notably those found in 
Alabama and Arizona,
4
 and a movement to ban birthright citizenship
5
 
became hot political topics that sent some Republican and Tea Party 
politicians scurrying to claim the positions their constituencies demanded.
6
  
But as popular concern regarding ―illegals‖7 dominated the discussion, 
federal immigration policy continued on, misunderstood and excluded 
from the highly political sound bites that shape public opinion.
8
 Most 
 
 
 1. Steven J. Johansen, Was Colonel Sanders a Terrorist? An Essay on the Ethical Limits of 
Applied Legal Storytelling, 7 J. ASS‘N LEGAL WRITING DIRECTORS 63, 63 (2010). 
 2. AUDREY SINGER & JILL H. WILSON, METRO. POLICY PROGRAM, THE IMPACT OF THE GREAT 
RECESSION ON METROPOLITAN IMMIGRATION TRENDS 1 (2010), available at http://www.brookings 
.edu/~/media/Files/rc/papers/2010/1216_immigration_singer_wilson/1216_immigration_singer_wilso
n.pdf (―During 2009, the U.S. economy was in the throes of the Great Recession, and immigration had 
become a highly polarized topic of debate, reflected by a rise in anti-immigrant sentiment.‖). 
 3. The Merriam-Webster Dictionary defines ―nativism‖ as ―a policy of favoring native 
inhabitants as opposed to immigrants.‖ Nativism Definition, MERRIAM-WEBSTER.COM, http://www 
.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/nativism (last visited May 19, 2012). For some prominent American 
nativist writings, see PETER BRIMELOW, ALIEN NATION: COMMON SENSE ABOUT AMERICA‘S 
IMMIGRATION DISASTER (1995), and Patrick J. Buchanan, Nation or Notion? America Rose from Kin 
and Culture, Not an Abstract Proposition, AM. CONSERVATIVE, Sept. 25, 2006, at 12. 
 4. Beason-Hammon Alabama Taxpayer and Citizen Protection Act, Pub. Act No. 535, 2011 
Ala. Laws 535; Support Our Law Enforcement and Safe Neighborhoods Act, ch. 113, 2010 Ariz. Sess. 
Laws 113. 
 5. Marc Lacey, On Immigration, Birthright Fight in U.S. Is Looming, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 5, 2011, 
at A1. 
 6. See, e.g., Julie Hirschfeld Davis, McCain Retools Immigration Stance, WASH. POST, Feb. 27, 
2008, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2008/02/27/AR2008022702495_pf.html. 
 7. Just as this Note focuses on the use of narratives, it is itself a narrative. I seek to use objective 
language, such as ―undocumented‖ rather than ―illegal,‖ that contributes to a nuanced discussion of 
underlying issues and avoids political ideologies. I must acknowledge that these choices themselves 
create a particular type of narrative effect.  
 8. There were some significant changes in federal immigration policy during the summer of 
2011 that, while provoking the ire of conservative pundits, actually received very little attention by the 
public. In particular, the Department of Homeland Security issued a memo stating that it would 
exercise prosecutorial discretion to administratively close removal cases for immigrants who presented 
certain favorable factors. In practical terms, the memo announces the Department‘s intention to focus 
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political rhetoric involves immigration from Mexico. Unbeknownst to 
many of those most passionate about immigration issues, people of 
Hispanic origin make up about 15 percent of the U.S. population, and only 
about 6 percent of the Hispanic population in the United States is foreign-
born.
9
 Those who are not foreign-born are U.S. citizens.
10
 Many of those 
who are foreign-born have legal status in the United States. Of the 
immigrants filling our land with different tongues and cultural diversity, 
most came legally as family-sponsored immigrants, as holders of 
employment-based visas, or, as this Note discusses, as refugees and 
asylees.
11
 
Over 73,000 refugees settled in the United States in 2010.
12
 The 
refugees had the necessary paperwork to legally immigrate to the United 
States after having been determined by the United Nations to be a victim 
of persecution.
13
 The vast majority of these immigrants were resettled 
from refugee camps to which they escaped after fleeing war, unrest, or 
other forms of persecution in their own native country.
14
 Similarly, those 
seeking asylum come to the United States after having suffered 
persecution but without formal recognition of their status.
15
 They arrive 
either under a temporary visa or without documentation and then seek 
recognition from the U.S. government that they are victims of persecution 
and qualify as asylees.
16
 
The narratives accompanying U.S. asylum law differ markedly from 
those filling the pages of the current immigration debate. Asylum 
 
 
its removal efforts on immigrants who have committed crimes. Memorandum from John Morton, Dir., 
U.S. Dep‘t of Homeland Sec., for All Field Office Directors, All Special Agents in Charge, and All 
Chief Counsel (June 17, 2011), available at http://www.ice.gov/doclib/secure-communities/pdf/ 
prosecutorial-discretion-memo.pdf.  
 9. ELIZABETH M. GRIECO, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, RACE AND HISPANIC ORIGIN OF THE 
FOREIGN-BORN POPULATION IN THE UNITED STATES: 2007, at 3 (2010), available at http://www 
.census.gov/prod/2010pubs/acs-11.pdf. 
 10. ―All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, 
are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside.‖ U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. 
The Supreme Court interpreted this clause to provide citizenship to people born in the United States, 
regardless of the parents‘ citizenship status. United States v. Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. 649, 704 
(1898). This principle is now codified in federal law. 8 U.S.C. § 1401 (2006). 
 11. Legal immigration to the United States occurs through four primary avenues: immediate 
relative and family sponsored visas, employment-based visas, diversity visas, and refugee admissions. 
MICHAEL A. SCAPERLANDA, IMMIGRATION LAW: A PRIMER 42 (2009). 
 12. FY10 Refugee Admissions Statistics, U.S. DEP‘T OF STATE, http://www.state.gov/j/prm/ 
releases/statistics/181160.htm (last visited May 19, 2012). 
 13. See infra note 23 for the definition of ―refugee.‖ 
 14. See infra note 23. 
 15. For a discussion of the standard for asylum, see infra Part I.B. 
 16. See infra notes 24–25 and accompanying text. 
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applicants‘ stories are filled with accounts of terrible suffering, courageous 
journeys, and hope for a future without fear.
17
 Raising awareness of these 
heroic individuals would add a different hue to the current discussion, 
which is colored more by vitriol and passion than by a true understanding 
of the diversity of global migration.  
But the asylum narrative also suffers shortcomings. To meet the 
standard required to obtain asylum, applicants must focus on their 
suffering, describing themselves as victims of their persecutors and their 
native land.
18
 This Note examines the ways the victim narrative can have 
long-lasting effects, primarily on the client but also on the attorney and on 
society as a whole. The immigration debate treats the applicants as 
powerless victims, rather than as a culturally diverse group of survivors 
that is contributing to the changing fabric of American society. But several 
steps can be taken, both on a practical individual level and through 
systemic changes, to mitigate such potential damage. 
Part I of this Note provides an overview of U.S. asylum law: the legal 
standards, the process by which individuals seek asylum, and the purposes 
of U.S. asylum law. Part II turns to the subject of narratives, focusing 
specifically on the victim narrative and its prevalence in asylum law. Part 
III addresses the many concerns raised by the use of the victim narrative in 
asylum law. Finally, Part IV follows with suggestions on how to mitigate 
these concerns. While many of these suggestions are hallmarks of the 
client-centered lawyering and Therapeutic Jurisprudence movements,
19
 
this Note focuses specifically on their application to victim narratives in 
asylum law. The result is a practical outline that practitioners and clients 
can use to maneuver within the rich narrative landscape and static legal 
standards and to create legal and personal narratives that achieve legal 
goals, personal growth, and societal enlightenment. 
 
 
 17. In fact, these stories are echoed by many immigrants who arrive in the United States, either 
with or without documentation. Some immigrants suffer economic deprivation, but such suffering 
rarely leads to a grant of asylee status. See infra note 51 and accompanying text (discussing the 
standard for economic persecution). Many Hispanic immigrants are unable to obtain asylum despite 
severe gang-related persecution. For more information on gang-related asylum claims, see generally 
Matthew J. Lister, Gang-Related Asylum Claims: An Overview and Prescription, 38 U. MEM. L. REV. 
827 (2008).  
 18. See infra note 145. 
 19. See infra notes 192–94 and accompanying text. 
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I. OUTLINING THE STORY: AN OVERVIEW OF U.S. ASYLUM LAW 
The United States granted asylum to over 21,000 individuals in 2010.
20
 
Much of the world is embroiled in life-threatening situations that create 
massive migration movements around the globe: conflicts, dictators, 
famines, natural disasters, and wars. Very few affected individuals make 
their way to the United States. Those fleeing turmoil may find refuge in 
their own country, where they are considered internally displaced.
21
 
Alternatively, they may seek protection outside their country of origin. 
Some make their way to a refugee camp,
22
 usually in a neighboring 
country, where they are given refugee status by the United Nations.
23
 
Others may make their way further, to countries around the world where 
they seek peace, often in the form of a grant of asylum. Individuals 
seeking asylum without refugee status come to the United States in one of 
three ways: legally on a short-term visa,
24
 without documentation, or with 
 
 
 20. DANIEL C. MARTIN, OFFICE OF IMMIGRATION STATISTICS, U.S. DEP‘T OF HOMELAND SEC., 
REFUGEES AND ASYLEES: 2010, at 1 (2011), available at http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/statistics/ 
publications/ois_rfa_fr_2010.pdf. 
 21. Thematic Areas: Displacement, U.N. OFF. FOR THE COORDINATION OF HUMANITARIAN AFF., 
http://www.unocha.org/what-we-do/policy/thematic-areas/displacement (last visited May 19, 2012) 
(explaining that internally displaced people do not receive refugee protection, but rather must rely on 
their own country or non-governmental organizations for aid). 
 22. Refugee camps are established on an emergency basis, but many remain in existence for 
decades. About one-third of refugees live in refugee camps. Urban Refugees, U.N. HIGH 
COMMISSIONER FOR REFUGEES, http://www.unhcr.org/pages/4b0e4cba6.html (last visited May 19, 
2012). 
 23. The United Nations uses the definition of ―refugee‖ found in the Convention and Protocol 
Relating to the Status of Refugees. See Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, July 28, 1951, 
19 U.S.T. 6259, 189 U.N.T.S. 150 [hereinafter Refugee Convention]; Protocol Relating to the Status 
of Refugees, Jan. 31, 1967, 19 U.S.T. 6223, 606 U.N.T.S. 267. The Convention provides that a refugee 
is one who, among other requirements, ―owing to well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of 
race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the 
country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the 
protection of that country.‖ Refugee Convention, supra, art. 1(A)(2). This definition closely resembles 
that used in the U.S. statute. See infra Part I.B (discussing the U.S. statutory standard for refugee 
status). 
 Once it determines that the individual seeking refugee status satisfies the requirements, the United 
Nations may aid the individual in resettling in their native country after danger has abated, resettling in 
a third country like the United States, or assimilating into the country in which the refugee camp is 
located. KATE JASTRAM & MARILYN ACHIRON, U.N. OFFICE FOR THE COORDINATION OF 
HUMANITARIAN AFFAIRS, REFUGEE PROTECTION: A GUIDE TO INTERNATIONAL REFUGEE LAW 21 
(2001), available at http://www.ipu.org/PDF/publications/refugee_en.pdf. 
 24. If such individuals are eligible for a permanent visa, they are welcome to apply for one. But 
such visas typically require long waiting times. See Visa Bulletin, U.S. DEP‘T OF STATE, 
http://travel.state.gov/visa/bulletin/bulletin_1360.html (last visited May 19, 2012). Further, if a 
permanent visa were obtained, the individual would have no need to apply for asylum, as a permanent 
visa provides legal status and a route to U.S. citizenship under the Immigration and Nationality Act. 
I.N.A. § 245(a); 8 U.S.C. § 1255(a) (2006). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol89/iss6/10
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an application for asylum upon arrival at a U.S. port of entry. All are 
equally able to apply for asylum.
25
 Asylum affirms the U.S. commitment 
to freedom and opportunity, but achieving that desired status can be 
complicated. U.S. asylum law is a confusing hopscotch of requirements 
that may be all but incomprehensible to the newly arrived, traumatized 
foreigner.  
A. The Purpose of Asylum Law 
U.S. immigration law has several purposes, but the purpose of asylum 
law is ―to provide a haven for refugees and asylum-seekers—people who 
are unable or unwilling to return to their home country because of 
persecution (or a well-founded fear of persecution) on account of their 
race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or 
political opinions.‖26 This policy carefully encapsulates the specific 
statutory definition of a refugee.
27
 That definition is carefully insulated 
from broad humanitarian efforts, such as to provide a better life or 
eliminate suffering.
28 
From a practical point of view, this policy conserves 
finite resources.
29
 The categories chosen exhibit a belief that 
discrimination based upon the enumerated categories is somehow more 
harmful, or at least more worthy of redress, than other suffering.
30
 Other 
purposes of U.S. immigration law include promoting family unity, 
admitting workers to enter the workforce as needed, and promoting 
diversity.
31
 These other goals are not achieved through asylum policy, but 
through other avenues of immigration law.  
 
 
 25. I.N.A. § 208(a)(1), 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a)(1) (2006). 
 26. CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, IMMIGRATION POLICY IN THE UNITED STATES 6 (2006), available at 
http://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/cbofiles/ftpdocs/70xx/doc7051/02-28-immigration.pdf.  
 27. See infra Part I.B (discussing the statutory standard for refugee status). 
 28. Eliminating physical suffering is not the end purpose of asylum law. For instance, asylum 
law does not provide a remedy for those suffering due to natural disasters or extreme poverty. Sarah 
Hinger, Finding the Fundamental: Shaping Identity in Gender and Sexual Orientation Based Asylum 
Claims, 19 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 367, 370 (2010).  
 29. STEPHEN H. LEGOMSKY & CRISTINA M. RODRÍGUEZ, IMMIGRATION AND REFUGEE LAW AND 
POLICY 987–88 (5th ed. 2009) (―While all victims of persecution would benefit from protection, the 
resources of the receiving countries are finite.‖). 
 30. Id. at 988 (―Congress presumably selected those categories because it believed that 
persecution, while inherently bad, is even worse when it discriminates on the basis of one of the 
named classifications or otherwise impedes the free flow of ideas.‖). 
 31. See IMMIGRATION POLICY IN THE UNITED STATES, supra note 26, at vii.  
Washington University Open Scholarship
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B. The Legal Standard for Asylum  
In order to receive asylum, the applicant must meet the definition of a 
refugee.
32
 The United States Code defines a ―refugee‖ as someone who 
cannot return to his or her country because of ―persecution or a well-
founded fear of persecution on account of race, religion, nationality, 
membership in a particular social group, or political opinion.‖33 
This definition includes several important aspects. The first significant 
portion of the statutory standard is past or future persecution. The 
refugee‘s inability to return to her home country must stem from either 
past persecution or a ―well-founded fear‖ of future persecution.34 This 
provides two routes that can be used separately or in combination to prove 
eligibility for asylum: (1) a retrospective consideration of past persecution, 
or (2) a prospective consideration of fear of future persecution. But asylum 
applicants rarely succeed by using only the first option. Past persecution 
creates a presumption of a well-founded fear of future persecution.
35
 If, 
however, opposing counsel or the immigration judge adequately rebuts the 
fear of future persecution, then proof of past persecution may be 
inadequate to obtain asylee status.
36
 The second route—fear of future 
persecution—is enough to establish a claim for asylum even without past 
persecution; that fear, however, must be both subjectively and objectively 
reasonable.
37 
 
 
 32. I.N.A. § 208(b)(1)(A), 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(A) (2006). 
 33. I.N.A. § 101(a)(42)(A), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A) (2006). 
 34. Id. For a discussion of what constitutes persecution, see infra text accompanying notes 45–
52. 
 35. 8 C.F.R. § 208.13(b)(1) (2011). 
 36. The sufficiency of past persecution in such cases becomes a discretionary matter. 8 C.F.R. 
§ 208.13(b)(2) (2011). If the presumption of fear of future persecution has been rebutted, asylum may 
be denied if changed circumstances make it such that the applicant no longer has a reasonable fear of 
future persecution. The asylum officer or immigration judge makes this decision ―in the exercise of his 
or her discretion.‖ Id. Thus, in certain cases, asylum may be granted solely on the basis of past 
persecution. See Milanouic v. Holder, 591 F.3d 566 (7th Cir. 2010) (holding that changed country 
conditions are sufficient to overcome the rebuttable presumption of future persecution established by a 
demonstration of past persecution, thus justifying denial of an asylum application). 
 37. INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 430–32 (1987) (noting that Congress established two 
standards: one requires objective evidence, and the other requires subjective fear). Variances in these 
standards can be applied. For example, fear of future persecution can be proven by the demonstration 
of a pattern or practice of persecution. 8 C.F.R. § 208.13(B)(2)(iii) (2006); see, e.g., Raghunathan v. 
Holder, 604 F.3d 371, 377 (7th Cir. 2010) (―A pattern or practice claim starts with the presumption 
that an alien failed to establish that he was persecuted . . . . Despite the absence of this evidence, an 
alien may prevail by establishing a pattern or practice of persecution . . . . But the level of persecution 
must be extreme . . . .‖). Minors may also receive special treatment and an amended standard. See 
Mejilla-Romero v. Holder, 614 F.3d 572 (1st Cir. 2010) (en banc) (holding that an immigration judge 
must follow the Department of Homeland Security‘s Guidelines for Children‟s Asylum Claims and the 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol89/iss6/10
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The second significant aspect of this standard is the requirement that 
the persecution be ―on account of‖ one of several categories: race, 
religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group,
38
 or political 
opinion.
39
 The ―on account of‖ standard has been interpreted as requiring 
evidence that the persecutor was motivated to target the applicant because 
of the protected ground.
40
 This opaque statement requires an asylum 
applicant to provide ―some evidence‖41 of her persecutor‘s motivation—a 
monumental task.
42
 This standard may be intended to help accomplish the 
purposes of asylum law.
 The ―on account of‖ standard screens out 
applicants who have ―merely‖ suffered harassment,43 rather than 
persecution deemed worthy of protection. Mere harassment is not 
necessarily less severe than persecution, but it stems from a non-targeted 
source and thus does not meet the ―on account of‖ requirement.44 
The statute itself does not define persecution. The Board of 
Immigration Appeals (―BIA‖) has developed a non-statutory definition of 
persecution: the ―infliction of harm or suffering by a government, or 
persons a government is unwilling or unable to control, to overcome a 
characteristic of the victim.‖45 This definition does little to illuminate the 
 
 
Guidelines for Immigration Court Cases Involving Unaccompanied Alien Children in dealing with 
child applicants for asylum). Finally, humanitarian asylum is available in extreme cases even without 
any fear of future persecution. See Kone v. Holder, 596 F.3d 141, 146 (2d Cir. 2010) (―[Humanitarian 
asylum] is reserved for persecuted aliens whose persecution was particularly severe or who may suffer 
‗other serious harm‘ if removed.‖ (quoting 8 C.F.R. § 1208.13(b)(1)(iii))).  
 38. The term ―particular social group‖ is not defined by statute or regulation, and courts have not 
developed a consistent definition. Edward L. Carter & Brad Clark, ―Membership in a Particular Social 
Group”: International Journalists and U.S. Asylum Law, 12 COMM. L. & POL‘Y 279, 292 (2007). 
 39. I.N.A. § 101(a)(42), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42) (2006). 
 40. A persecutor‘s political motivation, for example, is not relevant; it is only the applicant‘s 
characteristics that are. INS v. Elias-Zacarias, 502 U.S. 478, 482 (1992) (―The ordinary meaning of the 
phrase ‗persecution on account of . . . political opinion‘ in § 101(a)(42) is persecution on account of 
the victim‟s political opinion, not the persecutor‘s.‖). 
 41. Id. at 483 (―Elias-Zacarias objects that he cannot be expected to provide direct proof of his 
persecutors‘ motives. We do not require that. But since the statute makes motive critical, he must 
provide some evidence of it, direct or circumstantial.‖). 
 42. ―[P]ersecution obscure[s] the reasons that particular individuals were targeted . . . .‖ Susan 
Bibler Coutin, The Oppressed, the Suspect, and the Citizen: Subjectivity in Competing Accounts of 
Political Violence, 26 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 63, 64 (2001). 
 43. ―To show persecution, an alien must show more than ‗unpleasantness, harassment, and even 
basic suffering.‘‖ Barsoum v. Holder, 617 F.3d 73, 79 (1st Cir. 2010) (quoting Jorgji v. Mukasey, 514 
F.3d 53, 57 (1st Cir. 2008)). The opinion later finds that even injury associated with death threats 
―does not necessarily establish . . . persecution.‖ Id. at 79–80. 
 44.  For more discussion regarding the purpose of asylum law and the policy decisions 
accompanying it, see supra Part I.A. 
 45. In re Kasinga, 21 I. & N. Dec. 357, 365 (B.I.A. 1996). One critic says this standard is at best 
―inartfully worded‖ and at worst ―clearly contrary to the statute.‖ John S. Kane, Deference as Death 
Sentence—The Importance of Vigilant Judicial Review of Refugee-Claim Denials, 15 ANN. SURV. 
INT‘L & COMP. L. 279, 323 (2009). 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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issue, using only ―harm or suffering‖ in its attempt to elucidate the 
ambiguous term ―persecution.‖46 Commentators have provided some 
additional detail in their definitions of persecution. One authoritative 
scholar defines persecution as ―an action . . . rather than a condition, such 
as poverty. Persecution that is physical in nature . . . is more likely to 
‗count‘ as a basis for asylum than mere death threats, harassment, or 
psychological suffering.‖47 But persecution undoubtedly includes an entire 
spectrum of different types of harm.
48
 Case law provides fact-specific 
examples of what does not qualify as persecution: harassment
49
 and 
generalized conditions of fear
50
 or suffering, such as those stemming from 
economic poverty
51
 or natural disasters,
52
 are consistently ruled inadequate 
bases for a grant of asylum.  
The final significant factor that plays into many asylum cases is 
credibility.
53
 Questions of credibility can be raised in response to poor oral 
 
 
 46. For an authoritative analysis of the statutory meaning of persecution, see T. Alexander 
Aleinikoff, The Meaning of „Persecution‟ in United States Asylum Law, 3 INT‘L J. REFUGEE L. 5 
(1991).  
 47. Coutin, supra note 42, at 86. Coutin further explores the ways in which the law‘s conception 
of persecution is at odds with actual experiences of persecution. For example, she says persecution is 
defined ―as a discrete temporal event that has a clear beginning and ending . . . as something that 
happened in the past and is now over.‖ Id. at 87. In reality, most victims experience persecution as an 
event that is ―continually relived and that permanently marks individuals.‖ Id. The statutes and the 
courts fail to incorporate ―[s]uch notions of continual risk, long memory, inextricable connectedness, 
and institutionalized repression . . . .‖ Id. at 87–88. 
 48. Anwen Hughes, Asylum and Withholding of Removal—A Brief Overview of the Substantive 
Law, in BASIC IMMIGRATION LAW 2009, at 295, 303 (Practicing Law Institute ed., 2009). 
 49. Barsoum v. Holder, 617 F.3d 73, 79 (1st Cir. 2010). The word ―harassment‖ presents only 
further ambiguity, leading to the likely conclusion that a judge does not decide the case based on 
whether the suffering is persecution or harassment, but rather decides whether to grant asylum and 
then applies the appropriate label.  
 50. Mark R. von Sternberg, Emerging Bases of “Persecution” in American Refugee Law: 
Political Opinion and the Dilemma of Neutrality, 13 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT‘L L.J. 1, 3 (1989) (―[A] 
generalized fear of violence will not support a finding of ‗persecution‘ in the statutory sense.‖).  
 51. Economic suffering can be persecution, but the harm ―must be so severe that it threatens the 
life or freedom of the applicant.‖ Mirisawo v. Holder, 599 F.3d 391, 396 (4th Cir. 2010). 
 52. See In re Sosa Ventura, 25 I. & N. Dec. 391, 394 (B.I.A. 2010) (explaining that Congress 
created the alternative relief of Temporary Protected Status because natural disasters ―did not establish 
a basis for claiming persecution,‖ thus making those seeking protection from the effects of such 
incidents ineligible for asylum). 
 53. Michael Kagan, Is Truth in the Eye of the Beholder? Objective Credibility Assessment in 
Refugee Status Determination, 17 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 367, 368 (2003) (―[I]n practice, being deemed 
credible may be the single biggest substantive hurdle . . . .‖). All asylum applications filed after May 
11, 2005, are governed by new regulations put in place by the REAL ID Act. REAL ID Act of 2005, 
Pub. L. No. 109-13, 119 Stat. 231. The changes included increased discretion for judges seeking 
corroboration of claims. This change introduces a serious obstacle for applicants who have difficulty 
demonstrating their credibility. The credibility determination itself can be made on a ―totality of the 
circumstances‖ basis, giving the judge greater latitude to make adverse findings. I.N.A. 
§ 208(b)(1)(B)(iii), 8 U.S.C. § 1158 (b)(1)(B)(iii) (2006). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol89/iss6/10
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responses during an asylum hearing,
54
 inconsistencies between the written 
responses in an asylum application and the oral responses given in a 
hearing,
55
 or a lack of corroborating evidence.
56
 Credibility can be a 
particular challenge for traumatized clients,
57
 and adverse findings can 
have a harrowing effect on recovery from trauma. 
C. Legal Process  
An applicant must apply for asylum within one year of arriving in the 
United States unless the applicant can meet a stringent standard of 
changed circumstances.
58
 For fewer than half of all asylum applicants, the 
process begins with a visit to a lawyer‘s office.59 The government does not 
publish statistics on the success rate of represented applicants as opposed 
to unrepresented applicants, but a study spanning fiscal years 1994–2005 
reported that represented applicants were significantly more successful 
than pro se applicants. Claims by pro-se applicants were denied 93 percent 
of the time, compared to 64 percent for represented clients.
60
 Without legal 
representation, applicants have little understanding of the overall process 
and are often unprepared to effectively present their story.
61
  
The application process begins with the submission of Form I-589, in 
which the applicant provides his or her personal history and answers short 
 
 
 54. See, e.g., Espinosa-Cortez v. Att‘y Gen., 607 F.3d 101, 105 (3d Cir. 2010) (―[The 
immigration judge] found that Espinosa-Cortez‘s testimony concerning the FARC‘s pursuit of him to 
become their informant was credible, but she did not find his testimony concerning his Liberal Party 
campaign activities to be credible.‖).  
 55. Steven Forester, Haitian Asylum Advocacy: Questions to Ask Applicants and Notes on 
Interviewing and Representation, 10 N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM. RTS. 351, 413 (1993) (―Officers and judges, 
months or years after you submit the application, note the discrepancies between it and your client‘s 
live testimony and deny asylum based on omissions and inconsistencies between the two, often on 
minor points.‖). 
 56. REAL ID Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-13, 119 Stat. 231. 
 57. See infra note 156. 
 58. I.N.A. § 208(a)(2)(B), 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a)(2)(B) (2006).  
 59. Only 43 percent of applicants were represented by an attorney in fiscal year 2010. U.S. DEP‘T 
OF JUSTICE, EXEC. OFFICE FOR IMMIGRATION REVIEW, FY 2010 STATISTICAL YEARBOOK G1 (2011) 
[hereinafter FY 2010 STATISTICAL YEARBOOK], available at http://www.justice.gov/eoir/statspub/ 
fy10syb.pdf. The actual number may be slightly higher. The DOJ statistics reflect representation of 
clients whose cases are decided before an immigration judge. Id. Those applications granted by an 
asylum officer are not factored into this statistic, and given the success of most cases that are not 
referred to an immigration judge, see infra note 72, it might be assumed that such applicants had a 
somewhat higher than normal rate of representation. 
 60. Immigration Judges, TRAC IMMIGR. (July 31, 2006), http://trac.syr.edu/immigration/reports/ 
160/. The study found an overall asylum grant rate of 31 percent for fiscal year 1994 through the first 
few months of fiscal year 1995. In fiscal year 2010, 51 percent of asylum applications were approved 
in Immigration Court. See FY 2010 STATISTICAL YEARBOOK, supra note 59, at K1.  
 61. See infra note 132.  
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questions designed to elicit details regarding the alleged persecution.
62
 A 
lengthy affidavit from the applicant supplements the form and provides a 
―life story‖ focused particularly on those details that demonstrate why the 
applicant meets the standard for asylum.
63
 Corroborating evidence and 
supporting documentation accompany the application. The supporting 
documentation may include affidavits from family and friends, relevant 
news articles, country conditions, medical records, official documents, 
personal statements, photographs, or any other probative material.
64
 
Through each component, legal representatives seek to demonstrate 
specific ways the applicant meets each standard for asylum. 
An applicant submits the package to the United States Citizenship and 
Immigration Service, which then contacts the applicant for fingerprinting
65
 
and an interview with an asylum officer.
66
 The asylum officer conducts the 
interview under oath, considering all relevant evidence, including 
testimony by the applicant and any witnesses.
67
 The asylum officer then 
determines eligibility for asylum.
68
 If the officer determines that the 
applicant is both eligible for asylum and passes the discretionary hurdle,
69
 
asylum is granted.
70
 Otherwise, the asylum officer refers the case to an 
immigration judge,
71
 who then conducts a hearing to determine 
removability.
72 
This hearing once again requires testimony and the 
 
 
 62. See DEP‘T OF HOMELAND SEC. & U.S. DEP‘T OF JUSTICE, FORM I-589, APPLICATION FOR 
ASYLUM AND FOR WITHHOLDING OF REMOVAL (2010), available at http://www.uscis.gov/files/form/i-
589.pdf.  
 63. Stacy Caplow, Putting the “I” in Wr*t*ng: Drafting an A/Effective Personal Statement to 
Tell a Winning Refugee Story, 14 J. LEGAL WRITING INST. 249, 249 (2008) (―[A] written personal 
statement in affidavit format drafted by a legal representative will be the first exposure the fact finder 
has to the heart of the claim. That affidavit, like an opening statement, creates a lasting first impression 
that previews the facts, establishes the case theory, introduces the client, and sets the stage for all 
subsequent proceedings.‖ (footnote omitted)). 
 64. DEP‘T OF HOMELAND SEC. & U.S. DEP‘T OF JUSTICE, FORM I-589, APPLICATION FOR 
ASYLUM AND FOR WITHHOLDING OF REMOVAL: INSTRUCTIONS 8 (2010) [hereinafter FORM I-589 
INSTRUCTIONS], available at http://www.uscis.gov/files/form/i-589instr.pdf (―You must submit 
reasonably available corroborative evidence showing (1) the general conditions in the country from 
which you are seeking asylum, and (2) the specific facts on which you are relying to support your 
claim.‖). Corroborating evidence helps establish the credibility of the applicant. I.N.A. 
§ 208(b)(1)(B)(ii), 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(ii) (2006); see supra note 53. 
 65. I.N.A. § 208(d)(1), 8 U.S.C. § 1158(d)(1) (2006). 
 66. I.N.A. § 208(d)(5)(A)(ii), 8 U.S.C. § 1158(d)(5)(A)(ii) (2006). 
 67. 8 C.F.R. § 208.9(b) (2011). 
 68. I.N.A. § 208(b)(3)(C), 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(3)(C) (2006). 
 69. Even if an applicant is eligible, the adjudicator still has discretion to either grant or deny 
asylum. I.N.A. § 208(b)(1), 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1) (2006). 
 70. 8 C.F.R. § 208.14(b)–(c) (2011). 
 71. Id. 
 72. I.N.A. § 208(d)(5)(A)(iv), 8 U.S.C. § 1158 (d)(5)(A)(iv) (2006). ―Removal‖ is ―[t]he 
expulsion of an alien from the United States.‖ Definition of Terms, DEP‘T OF HOMELAND SEC. (Sept. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol89/iss6/10
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presentation of all relevant evidence. The immigration judge then decides 
whether to grant asylum, some other form of relief,
73
 or to issue an order 
of removal.
74
 
Appellate review of the immigration judge‘s ruling by the BIA is 
available.
75
 In FY 2010, only 8 percent of decisions were appealed,
76 
and 
79 percent of appellees were represented by an attorney.
77 
Upon appeal to 
the BIA, attorneys submit briefs, but no further testimony is necessary. 
The BIA issues an opinion that can then be appealed to the court of 
appeals.
78
 The Supreme Court reviews very few decisions rendered by the 
courts of appeals.
79
 For most applicants, the process ends with the asylum 
officer or the immigration judge. 
II. STORY TIME IN COURT: NARRATIVE STRUCTURE  
As legal representatives construct an asylum claim, they are writing a 
story that will determine the fate of their client. This Note explores the 
way those narratives intersect with the law, the client‘s well-being, and 
society as a whole. In order to begin that analysis, this Part considers the 
 
 
10, 2009), http://www.dhs.gov/files/statistics/stdfdef.shtm#17. The term encompasses decisions based 
on both inadmissibility (grounds for removal arose prior to the immigrant‘s admission to the United 
States) and deportability (grounds for removal arose after the immigrant was admitted to the United 
States). Id. 
 An asylum officer only refers the case to the immigration judge if the applicant does not have an 
alternative means to stay in the country legally. If the applicant is in the United States on a short-term 
visa that has not expired, then he or she is not removable until the expiration of the visa. In this 
situation, the application is simply denied, rather than referred to the immigration judge for the 
initiation of removal proceedings. 8 C.F.R. § 208.14(c) (2011). 
 73. One alternative form of relief, for example, is Withholding of Removal under I.N.A. 
§ 241(b)(3), 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3) (2006). 
 74. ―The term ‗order of deportation‘ means the order of the special inquiry officer, or other such 
administrative officer to whom the Attorney General has delegated the responsibility for determining 
whether an alien is deportable, concluding that the alien is deportable or ordering deportation.‖ I.N.A. 
§ 101(a)(47), 8 U.S.C. §1101(a)(47) (2006).  
 75. 8 C.F.R. § 250.53(a) (2011). 
 76. See FY 2010 STATISTICAL YEARBOOK, supra note 59, at X1. 
 77. Id. at V1. 
 78. I.N.A. § 242(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a) (2006). Only the asylum applicant, not the government, 
can appeal the BIA decision. EXEC. OFFICE OF IMMIGRATION REVIEW, U.S. DEP‘T OF JUSTICE, 
ASYLUM VARIATIONS IN IMMIGRATION COURT (2007), available at http://www.justice.gov/eoir/press/ 
07/AsylumVariationsNov07.htm. 
 79. In the last four years, the Supreme Court has heard only four cases involving asylum. See 
Kucana v. Holder, 130 S. Ct. 827 (2010) (deciding jurisdiction for judicial review of a BIA order 
refusing to reopen removal proceedings to hear new evidence in support of an asylum claim); Nken v. 
Holder, 129 S. Ct. 1749 (2009) (determining standard for granting a stay of removal pending petition 
for review of asylum denial); Negusie v. Holder, 555 U.S. 511 (2009) (interpreting the persecutor bar 
to eligibility for asylum); Gonzales v. Thomas, 547 U.S. 183 (2006) (remanding for a determination of 
whether an applicant was eligible for asylum on basis of membership in a particular social group). 
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basic scholarship on narratives in general, the victim narrative, victim 
narratives in asylum law, and concerns about the victim narrative.  
A. Narratives: An Overview  
What is a narrative? One researcher defined narrative as ―a form in 
which activities and events are described as having a meaningful and 
coherent order, imposing on reality a unity which it does not inherently 
possess.‖80 Lived experience is an impossibly complex tangle of different 
points of view, stream-of-consciousness reactions, and limited 
perception.
81
 In telling their stories, individuals seek to take this 
complicated experience and turn it into a coherent narrative.
82
 The attorney 
then takes this story, which is often non-chronological and difficult to 
follow,
83
 and fits it into the necessary form required for an asylum 
application. 
The difference between this final version of the story and the actual 
lived experience can sometimes represent a lack of absolute ―truth‖ in 
narrative.
84
 But narrative truth is the ―inescapably imperfect and fluid 
work of memory, organization and meaning.‖85 Working within the 
imperfections of human language and expression, the final product is, in 
the ideal situation, the best and only truth available to the legal system.
86
 
Narrative truth does not, however, always guarantee a believable and 
credible story. Stories have incredible power,
87
 but that power emerges 
only after the narrative passes a certain threshold of coherence, fidelity, 
and conformity to the listener‘s perception of the world.88 In the case of 
 
 
 80. Marita Eastmond, Stories as Lived Experience: Narratives in Forced Migration Research, 20 
J. REFUGEE STUD. 248, 250 (2007). 
 81. See Carol M. Suzuki, Unpacking Pandora‟s Box: Innovative Techniques for Effectively 
Counseling Asylum Applicants Suffering from Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder, 4 HASTINGS RACE & 
POVERTY L.J. 235, 260 (2007) (―[P]eople take in sensory fragments and unconsciously store them into 
a personal narrative. . . . The reconstructive process of autobiographical memory results in a 
recollection of the past that is subject to distortion. It is not a literal recording of the past.‖). 
 82. See Eastmond, supra note 80, at 250 (―Narrative also inevitably reduces experience which, in 
its vitality and richness, always far exceeds the expression which a person can give it.‖). 
 83. See infra note 139. 
 84. See Eastmond, supra note 80, at 260 (―[S]tories are never transparent renditions of reality, 
but partial and selective versions of it, arising out of social interaction.‖). 
 85. Id. 
 86. An ideal situation assumes honesty and reasonable memory on the part of the client, and 
narrative fidelity, ethics, and reasonable skill on the part of the advocate. 
 87. See Johansen, supra note 1, at 63. 
 88. Id. at 67 (―To be believable, stories must have narrative coherence and fidelity. . . . [S]tories 
need to fit into the listener‘s understanding of the way the world, or at least the world of the story, acts. 
But what stories do not have to be is true.‖). 
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traumatic
89
 suffering inflicted by fellow human beings, asylum narratives 
often diverge from the average listener‘s comfortable conceptions of their 
fellow human beings. This causes the listener to search even more deeply 
for comprehensible motives on the part of the persecutor, a detail that is 
often obscured from the victim.
90
 
Asylum law, of course, does not require acceptance by an ―average‖ 
listener, but by an immigration judge that is both trained and experienced 
in assessing such accounts. Immigration judges who are assigned to hear 
asylum cases are familiar with country conditions and asylum claims,
91
 
and thus would presumably respond less adversely to the inexplicable 
nature of human cruelty. But judges are not immune from the power of 
narrative, in which ―[n]arrative coherence and fidelity, not truth, is what 
makes a story believable.‖92 Success of an asylum claim may therefore 
turn less on merit than on storytelling skills,
93
 raising ethical issues and 
questions about the entire system of asylum adjudication.
94
  
A further concern regarding narratives is that they operate not only on a 
logical level, but also on an emotional one.
95
 The use of feelings in legal 
advocacy ―seems at odds with our traditional concepts of objective, 
impartial justice,‖ raising ―concerns that storytelling is unfairly 
manipulative.‖96 It is difficult to imagine an asylum claim that avoids the 
implication of emotion, as the very basis of an asylum claim rests upon the 
emotion of fear and, usually, pain. But concerns about overly 
manipulative, emotional accounts may cause decision-makers to adopt a 
more skeptical approach than would otherwise be expected.
97
 
 
 
 89. ―Trauma is the harm produced by a traumatic experience. Traumatic experiences shake the 
foundations of our beliefs about safety, and shatter our assumptions of trust. . . . [But b]y and large, 
these are normal responses to abnormal events.‖ Lynette M. Parker, Increasing Law Students‟ 
Effectiveness When Representing Traumatized Clients: A Case Study of the Katharine & George 
Alexander Community Law Center, 21 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 163, 168 (2007) (internal quotation marks 
omitted). 
 90. See supra notes 40–42 and accompanying text. 
 91. Caplow, supra note 63, at 256. 
 92. Johansen, supra note 1, at 64. 
 93. This is problematic, however, as traumatized applicants are particularly likely to have 
incoherent or inconsistent stories. While ―discrepancies in recall over time do not necessarily indicate 
lying,‖ Suzuki, supra note 81, at 258, adjudicators often interpret them as such. As a result, they tend 
to issue an adverse credibility finding if there is any divergence in accounts. See supra note 55. As will 
be examined infra, the importance of the claim‘s merit is also diminished by disparities in judicial 
decision-making.  
 94. The ethical issue most relevant to use of the victim narrative is selective storytelling. See 
infra text accompanying notes 170–71 and accompanying text. 
 95. Johansen, supra note 1, at 64. 
 96. Id. 
 97. A related issue is a lack of congruence between the emotion portrayed by the storyteller, or 
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B. Creating Characters: Victim Narratives  
The search for narrative coherence and fidelity
98
 leads to the creation of 
certain formulaic structures that are readily recognizable, and thus 
effective, narrative forms.
99
 The victim narrative is one of these 
structures.
100
 It focuses on the sources of suffering and death that shape 
refugees into recognizable victims, thus ―paint[ing the refugees] as 
sympathetic figures for the American audience which receives them.‖101 
Some scholars divide victim narratives into two general types: innocent 
victim narratives and victim-as-manipulator narratives.
102
 The first evokes 
pity; the second, suspicion.
103
 Pity leads to a feeling of superiority and 
characterization of the victim as ―other.‖104 Suspicion leads, in asylum 
cases, to adverse credibility findings.
105
 Thus, the attorney and client 
typically gravitate towards the innocent victim construct in an effort to 
achieve the legal goal of asylum. 
1. Everyone Is a Victim 
On a very broad level, everyone faces the danger of succumbing to a 
victim narrative.
106
 Going to the doctor or any sort of specialist, 
particularly for an ongoing or chronic ailment, provides an opportunity for 
self-identification tied to that particular suffering. In such situations, 
 
 
asylum applicant, and the emotion inherent within the story. ―The cognitive dissonance between 
hearing a story that should be emotionally evocative and not feeling that reaction because the applicant 
is perceived as distant leads to a subconscious skepticism in the Immigration Judge‘s mind.‖ Frank M. 
Walsh & Edward M. Walsh, Effective Processing or Assembly-Line Justice? The Use of 
Teleconferencing in Asylum Removal Hearings, 22 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 259, 269 (2008).  
 98. Johansen, supra note 1, at 63. 
 99. Laura L. Rovner, Perpetuating Stigma: Client Identity in Disability Rights Litigation, 2001 
UTAH L. REV. 247, 287. 
 100. In the context of refugee stories, another frequent narrative frame is the search for the 
American Dream. Sarah J. Steimel, Refugees as People: The Portrayal of Refugees in American 
Human Interest Stories, 23 J. REFUGEE STUD. 219, 219 (2010).  
 101. Id. at 227. Given the other dominant immigrant discourses accompanying discussions of 
immigration (illegals, usurpers, etc.), this is a relatively positive frame for American society. 
 102. Rovner, supra note 99, at 288. Rovner describes the innocent victim as one of the most 
common characters, featuring ―an image of a person who is not responsible for her condition, who is 
weak, submissive, defeated, and pitiable.‖ Id. The victim-as-manipulator narrative, on the other hand, 
reflects the ―idea that everyone is somehow trying to claim victimhood, and that doing so ‗reflects a 
readiness not merely to feel sorry for oneself but to wield one‘s resentments as weapons of social 
advantage and to regard deficiencies as entitlements to society‘s deference.‘‖ Id. at 293 (quoting 
CHARLES J. SYKES, A NATION OF VICTIMS 12 (1992)). 
 103. Id. at 289, 295. 
 104. Id. at 289. 
 105. See Kagan, supra note 53, at 368. 
 106. Thanks to Professor Legomsky for this insight. 
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however, individuals have agency to determine what part of their suffering 
to share, with whom to share it, and whether to accept the proposed 
treatment. While the patient may face some power differential—
particularly if less well educated or of lower socioeconomic status
107—the 
doctor has no power to force the client to submit to a proposed course of 
treatment. The patient retains agency to decide how to address the 
suffering that has become a part of his story, thus preventing the suffering 
from supplanting a more complete personal identity. 
2. Every Case Has a Victim 
On a somewhat more narrow level, litigation has the potential to evoke 
victim narratives in several areas of law, particularly those involving the 
disabled
108
 or the poor.
109
 In such cases, legal recovery is often premised 
upon the creation of a sufficiently victimized plaintiff. The legal system 
dictates the standards upon which legal goals may be met, and if the 
plaintiff wants ―justice,‖ it can only be obtained through the use of a 
victim narrative.
110
  
3. Every Asylee Is a Victim 
The above-described cases can be differentiated from asylum cases in 
three crucial ways. First, most disability and poverty litigation is elective. 
Disability discrimination cases seek to obtain compensation for ill-
treatment. While a loss in such cases may be serious on both financial and 
emotional levels, there are no additional consequences imposed upon the 
plaintiff. Losing welfare benefits creates a heavy burden on impoverished 
individuals by removing a primary source of income, but legal action 
 
 
 107. See generally Dean C. Barnlund, The Mystification of Meaning: Doctor-Patient Encounters, 
51 J. MED. EDUC. 716 (1976).  
 108. In disability rights cases, the plaintiff must first establish his own disability before proving 
how he has been harmed. See Rovner, supra note 99, at 250–52. The harm is usually discrimination 
based upon a protected characteristic—the disability. One lawyer said, for example, ―I would counsel 
clients to describe themselves as totally helpless in order to convince the court that they met the 
statutory definition of disability.‖ Lucie E. White, Subordination, Rhetorical Survival Skills, and 
Sunday Shoes: Notes on the Hearing of Mrs. G., 38 BUFF. L. REV. 1, 28 (1990). This disability 
standard echoes that of asylum law and implicates similar concerns. For more about the use of victim 
narratives in disability rights cases, see Rovner, supra note 99. 
 109. See White, supra note 108, at 46 (noting that when working with a client appealing a demand 
for repayment of welfare benefits, victim identity ―was the only strategy for the hearing that the lawyer 
. . . could imagine for [the client]‖).  
 110. ―[T]he price for disabled people of using those statutes to enforce their rights may be to force 
them to adopt the very stereotypes Congress sought to eradicate in passing the laws.‖ Rovner, supra 
note 99, at 250. 
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remains an optional avenue for obtaining relief. Legitimate asylum 
applicants, on the other hand, face much more severe consequences if they 
fail to obtain relief: the likelihood of persecution or even death if they are 
not allowed to remain in the United States.
111
  
Second, litigation necessitates the presence of an identifiable adversary. 
In disability cases, for example, the opponent is the party who has 
perpetrated the wrong and is being asked to pay.
112
 Such parties 
understandably defend themselves out of a sense of self-preservation. In 
asylum cases, on the other hand, the adversary is the government, which 
presumably faces no disadvantage upon the success of the asylum 
applicant.
113
 Rather, the government‘s goal is to question the very 
suffering that forms the victim identity presented by the asylum 
applicant.
114
 This requires that asylum applicants assume the victim 
identity even more completely, stabilizing their narratives against the 
inevitable attack of opposing forces. They tell their stories as evidence, 
rather than in an effort to seek healing.
115
  
Finally, asylum applicants have frequently experienced trauma, a level 
of harm not frequently suffered by those seeking medical attention or even 
compensation in disability or welfare-related cases. 
These special concerns make asylum victim narratives ripe for analysis 
and criticism. Such concerns may ring hollow to many. The elaboration of 
victimhood is intricately interwoven within our system of justice, and 
there is no rational alternative to the current system for granting asylum. 
Further exploration of systematic weaknesses is necessary, however, both 
in efforts to improve the system and to effectively work within it. As this 
Note examines, the victim narrative as applied in the context of asylum 
has many important implications for the client, attorney, and society.  
For many asylum applicants, staying in the United States is only one of 
many critical steps in the process of recovery from traumatization. These 
steps are not entirely within the realm of the legal field;
116
 neither, 
however, are they completely divorced from it. Attorneys inevitably 
 
 
 111. See supra Part I.B for the asylum standard. 
 112. Rovner, supra note 99, at 285. 
 113. The only conceivable damage to the government would occur if the asylee utilizes public 
benefits, which is not in any way relevant to the standard upon which asylum is granted. 
 114. See supra notes 43–52 and accompanying text (regarding the standard for determining 
whether an applicant has suffered persecution, rather than mere harassment or another unqualified 
form of suffering). 
 115. Evert Bloemen et al., Psychological and Psychiatric Aspects of Recounting Traumatic Events 
by Asylum Seekers, in CARE FULL: MEDICO-LEGAL REPORTS AND THE ISTANBUL PROTOCOL IN 
ASYLUM PROCEDURES 42, 76 (René Bruin et al. eds., 2006). 
 116. See infra notes 211–12 and accompanying text. 
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encounter the broader life effects of the trauma and must confront these 
issues in order to construct a convincing narrative. Once embroiled in the 
client‘s deeper, ongoing issues, the choice to limit one‘s involvement to 
the presentation of the asylum claim appears limited.
117
 Opportunities 
abound to work both within traditional legal boundaries and to expand 
those limited conceptions to address and, when possible, limit the negative 
effects of the victim narrative. The legal field can only benefit from 
critical analysis of its role in the lives of clients and in society, taking legal 
action one step beyond constrained legal goals and into the broader realm 
of societal change. 
C. Narratives in the Asylum Process 
For represented asylum applicants, attorneys shape the narratives 
provided by their clients.
118
 This process begins in the initial client 
meeting as the attorney asks questions in order to determine whether the 
client can meet the standard for asylum. This process continues throughout 
subsequent meetings as the attorney gathers further details and drafts the 
affidavit. Throughout this process, the attorney distills the truth from the 
client‘s version of his or her story into an acceptable format for the legal 
system. This requires the construction of narrative truth, which ideally 
conforms as closely as possible to the client‘s lived experience. But the 
final affidavit is a narrative constructed through the joint efforts of both 
client and attorney, an amalgamation of both voices and points of view.
119
 
Oral testimony in front of an asylum officer or in immigration court 
supplements the written narratives of the application.
120
 At this point the 
narrative rests in the hands of the client, who responds to questions by the 
attorney, the government, and the asylum officer or immigration judge.
121
 
Attorneys spend substantial time prior to the hearing preparing their 
 
 
 117. For many asylum applicants, an ―attorney might be [the] only point of contact with anyone in 
the United States outside of the underground network of persons in exile that assist one another in 
survival. . . . [This] can raise many issues which cannot be satisfied by legal means.‖ Ingrid Loreen, 
Therapeutic Jurisprudence and the Law School Asylum Clinic, 17 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 835, 835 
(2005).  
 118. Unrepresented applicants face related problems but with added difficulties, such as language 
barriers, lack of familiarity with the U.S. legal system, and lack of experience with asylum claims in 
particular. This Note focuses on represented applicants and the interaction between client, attorney, 
and the legal system. 
 119. This concept is recognized in other disciplines like anthropology, but it also applies to 
lawyers. ―In all stories, the personal voice is always interwoven with those of many others, and in 
narrative analysis it necessarily includes that of the researcher.‖ Eastmond, supra note 80, at 261. 
 120. I.N.A. § 208(d)(5)(A)(ii)–(iv), 8 U.S.C. § 1158(d)(5)(A)(ii)–(iv) (2006). 
 121. 8 C.F.R. § 1240.70(d) (2011). 
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clients for the hearing and attempting, as much as possible, to create a 
coherent and credible narrative in both written and oral versions.
122
 From a 
legal standpoint, this transition from attorney control to client control over 
the narrative represents a dangerous intersection where outside observers 
might detect weaknesses in the case.
123
 But from a narrative standpoint, 
and perhaps from a strategic standpoint, the oral narrative provides the 
client with a greater opportunity to present his or her story and to convince 
the immigration judge of the merits of the asylum claim.
124
 The hearing 
before the immigration judge establishes the ―known‖ facts for the record. 
Any appeals rely on the factual basis established in the hearing and the 
application, with greater emphasis often placed upon the oral account.
125
  
III. THE DARK SIDE OF STORY TIME: CONCERNS WITH THE VICTIM 
NARRATIVE 
The legal standard for asylum most often requires a demonstration of 
past persecution.
126
 This presents the need for a perfect, or at least 
adequate, victim.
127
 Thus, an effective legal advocate will shape the 
client‘s story to meet this standard as much as possible within ethical 
limits. Regardless of the attorney‘s misgivings regarding the use of the 
victim narrative, zealous advocacy requires that the attorney not subvert 
the client‘s goals for some higher ideological cause of usurping the victim 
narrative.
128
 But narrative theory teaches that the story becomes a piece of 
reality, forming and shaping attitudes and opinions, and even creating 
 
 
 122. See Parker, supra note 89, at 179 (noting that learning how to prepare a client to testify is a 
critical skill for clinic students representing asylum applicants). 
 123. Given the many difficulties traumatized clients may have sharing their story, taking their 
account outside the relatively safe domain of a trusting attorney-client relationship could lead to 
inconsistencies in the story. See infra note 153. 
 124. ―In spite of the constraints of verbal accounts, they are more effective than written 
statements, ‗reducing claimants‘ life histories to dry, objective facts which may or may not capture 
their reasons for fearing persecution.‘‖ Eastmond, supra note 80, at 262 n.4 (quoting PETER SHOWLER, 
REFUGEE SANDWICH: STORIES OF EXILE AND ASYLUM xvi (2006)). 
 125. See, e.g., Khattabi v. I.N.S., No. 95-9504, 1995 WL 684371, at *2 (10th Cir. Nov. 17, 1995) 
(―The BIA did consider [the affidavit containing significant amounts of hearsay], and gave it exactly 
the weight it merited, which is less weight than it accorded Ms. Youngman‘s live testimony.‖). 
 126. I.N.A. § 101(a)(42)(A), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A) (2006). 
 127. For a discussion of this tendency in other areas of the law, such as trafficking, see Jayashri 
Srikantiah, Perfect Victims and Real Survivors: The Iconic Victim in Domestic Human Trafficking 
Law, 87 B.U. L. REV. 157 (2007). 
 128. Dina Francesca Haynes, Client-Centered Human Rights Advocacy, 13 CLINICAL L. REV. 379, 
414 (2006) (―You are not a bystander offering objective scholarly expertise if you are asking the 
practitioner to help you subvert or expand the client‘s goals in favor of a larger cause.‖).  
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truth since full unprocessed reality cannot be properly conceptualized.
129
 
Thus, the created reality of the client‘s application narrative becomes part 
of his or her self-identification. It also shapes public opinion, to the extent 
that the story is shared in a public forum.
130
 Thus, the power of narrative 
turns the legal process into a vehicle for personal and societal definition. 
This Part examines the concerns raised by this dynamic for asylum 
applicants, attorneys, and society at large. 
A. Concerns for the Asylum Applicant  
Possible concerns for the asylum applicant include re-traumatization, 
re-victimization, frustration with self-identity, and high anxiety stemming 
from both the uncertainty of his or her claim and the enormous 
consequences the decision will have on the future. The following analysis 
considers these concerns in the context of the chronological process of an 
asylum claim. 
The potential harm to the asylum applicant begins immediately upon 
formation of the attorney-client relationship. The attorney immediately 
and unavoidably assumes a position of power over the client, with the 
authority to set the rules of engagement.
131
 The client has little 
understanding of the necessary requirements to obtain asylum, thus 
 
 
 129. See Eastmond, supra note 80, at 260.  
 130. This inevitably occurs as affirmative asylum applicants continue to live and work in society 
while their claims are being adjudicated. Defensive asylum applicants, on the other hand, apply for 
asylum as a relief from removal proceedings and thus may or may not be detained while proceedings 
take place. Obtaining Asylum in the United States, U.S. CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGR. SERVS. (Mar. 10, 
2011), http://www.uscis.gov/asylum (follow ―Obtaining Asylum in the United States‖ hyperlink). The 
applicant initiates an affirmative asylum case as an application for a benefit for which she is eligible. 
Id. 
 Opinions form around both individual interactions with asylees and the collective impact of the 
universe of stories to which each individual is exposed. See supra note 101 and accompanying text. 
 131. ―[The client] had to tell me everything awful that had ever happened to her, and I had all the 
power to probe her for more information and for more tragic specifics.‖ Loreen, supra note 117, at 
837; see also Suzuki, supra note 81, at 270 (―Trauma survivors may come to see subsequent 
relationships through the lens of dominance and submission.‖). 
 Also consider the following: 
The dyadic therapeutic situation itself may be evocative of certain aspects of the torture 
experience: for example, two people, one of whom is licensed by or a representative of the 
state or larger society and the other of whom is vulnerable and in need, meeting privately in a 
room; the questioning of extremely personal matters, a process often experienced as intrusive; 
the character of the regular sessions being explicitly subject to privacy; the discrepancy in 
power; and the intensity of emotion usually evoked by the process. 
Kenneth S. Pope & Rosa E. Garcia-Peltoniemi, Responding to Victims of Torture: Clinical Issues, 
Professional Responsibilities, and Useful Resources, 22 PROF. PSYCHOL.: RESOURCES & PRAC. 269, 
271 (1991).  
Washington University Open Scholarship
  
 
 
 
 
1504 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [VOL. 89:1485 
 
 
 
 
requiring absolute dependence upon the attorney.
132
 This dependent 
relationship curtails the asylum applicant‘s sense of agency, a potentially 
critical trait in his or her survival thus far.
133
 Upon the attorney‘s request, 
the client must provide endless details regarding highly personal and 
traumatic events.
134
  
Depending on the coping mechanism the client uses to deal with past 
trauma, attorney-client interactions could be extremely difficult and even 
psychologically harmful.
135
 The effects of pain and suffering upon 
language have been well-documented.
136
 Many individuals respond to 
trauma with silence,
137
 never allowing their lived experience to be 
transformed into the reality of a narrative. Others may have voiced certain 
aspects of their experiences, but never across cultural lines.
138
  
The attorney‘s job is to take the client‘s story, which may be disjointed 
and non-chronological notwithstanding the obstacle of past trauma,
139
 and 
turn it into a coherent narrative that fits the framework of a traditional 
asylum claim. This process of crystallizing a personal life narrative 
presents additional opportunities for re-victimization. Fitting unique 
individual experiences into the asylum framework requires a certain 
homogenization of claims.
140
 Asylum law appears to award the ―iconic‖ 
 
 
 132. See Eastmond, supra note 80, at 260 (―[W]hile the criteria for judging a story convincing are 
usually not fully known to the narrator, the price of failure (i.e. deportation) is enormous.‖). 
 133. Id. at 253 (―Nor are refugees necessarily helpless victims, but rather likely to be people with 
agency and voice.‖). 
 134. One practitioner observed, ―but for my being her attorney, and but for the asylum system 
requiring her to detail every terrible life occurrence to prove her fears of returning home were justified, 
she would not be telling me any of this.‖ Loreen, supra note 117, at 836. 
 135. See Parker, supra note 89, at 175–76 (―The greatest risk to the client is that she will be re-
traumatized when she is forced to talk about or remember a traumatic event.‖). 
 136. See Eastmond, supra note 80, at 258 (―Power may also work on memory and narration in 
more insidious ways . . . traumatic experiences tend to fragment memory, undermine trust, and inhibit 
expression.‖); see also Parker, supra note 89, at 170–71 (pointing out that traumatized clients often do 
not want to talk about traumatic events and may exhibit forgetfulness or avoidance). 
 137. See Caplow, supra note 63, at 266 (―[T]rauma may interfere with recollection or with the 
ability to talk about the events. . . . [T]he individual simply may lack the language to describe feelings 
or occurrences even when speaking in their native tongue.‖); see also Loreen, supra note 117, at 839 
(noting that torture or trauma ―may adversely impact an asylum seeker‘s ability to cogently present his 
story.‖). Eastmond also speaks extensively about the ability of violence to interfere with narrative and 
language. See Eastmond, supra note 80, at 259. 
 138. See infra note 153 and accompanying text. 
 139. Clients tend to ―omit details, go off on tangents, and drift between time frames.‖ Caplow, 
supra note 63, at 266. Trauma exasperates this natural tendency, particularly in cases of post-traumatic 
stress disorder (―PTSD‖). Suzuki, supra note 81, at 239 (―PTSD can profoundly affect the ability to 
tell consistent and detailed stories of past persecution.‖). 
 140. Hinger, supra note 28, at 367 (―[T]he surest way for applicants and advocates to demonstrate 
that the asylum standard is met is to put forward a familiar and universalized picture of the persecuted 
woman, lesbian, or gay man, minimizing variability or complicating factors in the individual case.‖). 
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victim whose claim has few complicating elements.
141
 By essentializing 
the client‘s story in this manner, the client‘s identity becomes intertwined 
with the persecution, rather than being a complex combination of the 
client‘s entire lived experience.142 The victim narrative becomes a victim 
identity—an ―extremely limiting‖ role that ―leaves no room for any other 
features of a person‘s identity.‖143  
The asylum process also attacks those features of an individual‘s 
identity that are defined by cultural or national characteristics. The asylum 
standard requires that persecution not stem from merely personal 
persecution.
144
 Rather, the government must either participate in the 
persecution, refuse to respond to the persecution, or be unable to stop the 
persecution.
145
 This forces applicants to construct their asylum 
applications in such a way that their native country becomes an antagonist 
in their personal narratives.
146
 They are thus encouraged to abandon all 
allegiance to national practices or, often, cultural practices.
147
 The 
alternative is to risk being deemed not credible. 
All of these risks to the client occur before the asylum application has 
even been filed. The process of filing the victim narrative provides 
additional opportunities for re-victimization. First, the chronic anxiety 
caused by the wait can aggravate existing feelings of uncertainty and 
 
 
Practitioners may prefer this method, utilizing the framework to develop successful claims. See Troy 
E. Elder, Antagonizing, 40 U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REV. 301, 303 (2009) (―[S]takeholders in the 
system of refugee admissions likely welcome it: stock settings play a valuable role in narrative 
production, providing an archetypal location from which the specifics of case storytelling can 
proceed.‖). But this framework also presents challenges to the asylum applicant and his definition of 
identity.  
 141. Elder, supra note 140, at 312. Asylum law ―encourages applicants to narrowly define the 
basis for their claim and deemphasize complicating elements. . . . Thus, ‗the successful asylum seeker 
must cast herself as a cultural Other, that is, as someone fleeing from a more primitive culture.‘‖ 
Hinger, supra note 28, at 384 (quoting SHERENE H. RAZACK, LOOKING WHITE PEOPLE IN THE EYE: 
GENDER, RACE, AND CULTURE IN COURTROOMS AND CLASSROOMS 92 (1998) (as quoted in Anita 
Sinha, Note, Domestic Violence and U.S. Asylum Law: Eliminating the “Cultural Hook” for Claims 
Involving Gender-Related Persecution, 76 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1562, 1578 (2001))). 
 142. The standardization of claims also paves the way for fraudulent applications. See infra note 
169. Though not addressed by this Note, adopting a fictional identity for the purposes of remaining in 
the United States presents a new array of potential identity issues. 
 143. Rovner, supra note 99, at 290. For a discussion regarding the possibility of this reaction to 
any type of suffering, see supra text accompanying notes 106–10. 
 144. See supra note 45. 
 145. ―[S]cene-setting is crucial to the production of a persuasive narrative. . . . But to prove her 
claim and find safety in a country of refuge, she must, under international refugee law, indict ‗Bogatá‘ 
as a participant in her persecution, be it through governmental indifference or as a willing co-
victimizer.‖ Elder, supra note 140, at 302.  
 146. Id. at 303 (―Bogatá itself has been antagonized.‖). 
 147. This force may be related to efforts to integrate immigrants, but it was not constructed with 
that goal in the mind, and the merits of such a goal are not addressed in this Note.  
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insecurity. After filing the application, the applicant must wait up to forty-
five days for an interview with an asylum officer.
148
 If the case is referred 
to an immigration judge, another long waiting period ensues. During this 
time, asylum applicants may feel that they are no longer in control of their 
destiny; their future will once again be shaped by unknown authority 
figures, echoes of their former persecutors.
149
 
During the interview with the asylum officer and the hearing with the 
immigration judge,
150
 asylum applicants must once again share intimate 
details with absolute strangers who will determine their future—another 
unequal power dynamic that may echo the original trauma. This can be a 
particular problem for women who have suffered sexual assault and must 
share the details of that experience in a credible and convincing way with 
a male officer or judge.
151
 Cultural taboos regarding male-female 
conversation or discussion of sexual topics may compound the 
psychological stress of these situations.
152
 
The hearing before the asylum officer or immigration judge proceeds 
without any efforts to build trust or cultural understanding between the 
adjudicator and the applicant, in contrast to what ideally occurs in the 
attorney-client relationship.
153
 Depending on the applicant‘s cultural 
 
 
 148. I.N.A. § 208(d)(5)(A)(ii), 8 U.S.C. § 1158(d)(5)(A)(ii) (2006). 
 149. See Eastmond, supra note 80, at 260 (―Asylum determination hearings, in their contexts of 
radical inequality and uncertainty, constitute a profoundly challenging context for refugee stories.‖ 
(internal citations omitted)). 
 150. See supra Part I.C for an explanation of the immigration process, including the interview 
with an asylum officer and the hearing with an immigration judge. 
 151. One commentator explains: 
Women who have been tortured or traumatized face large psychological barriers . . . which 
prohibit them from testifying consistently and with the appropriate demeanor. Thus, under the 
REAL ID Act, women asylum seekers, particularly victims of rape or sexual assault, are at 
risk of being erroneously deemed not credible. 
Katherine E. Melloy, Telling Truths: How the REAL ID Act‟s Credibility Provisions Affect Women 
Asylum Seekers, 92 IOWA L. REV. 637, 640 (2007).  
 The problem is exasperated by the disproportionately high number of male judges. One study 
found seventy-eight female judges as compared to 169 male judges. Jaya Ramji-Nogales et al., 
Refugee Roulette: Disparities in Asylum Adjudication, 60 STAN. L. REV. 295, 342 n.78 (2007). At the 
agency level, the disparity was smaller but still present: of immigration officers who decided fifty or 
more asylum cases, 264 were male and 257 were female. Id. at 343. 
 152. Melloy, supra note 151, at 641. Thanks to Professor Legomsky for this insight.  
 153. Immigration judges are presumed to have cultural understanding. Caplow, supra note 63, at 
256. But this understanding and training is still subject to misleading assumptions: 
Asylum law, like liberal legal theory, presumes the existence of a generic or universal 
personhood that is essentially devoid of cultural, class, ethnic, or other content. Thus, the 
judge who assesses an asylum application and the individual asylum applicant are presumed 
to share basic assumptions about risk, reality, and fear.  
Coutin, supra note 42, at 83. The existence of presumptions and expectations of this sort is particularly 
relevant to determinations of credibility and reasonableness.  
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competence and the attorney‘s preparation of the client, the applicant may 
still have a great deal of uncertainty regarding the elements necessary to 
obtain asylum.
154
 The asylum applicant‘s portrayal of facts and 
circumstances must not only be accurate, but narratively recognizable.
155
 
Without the benefit of reflection and deliberation that accompanies written 
narratives, clients must voice their most traumatic experiences in a 
convincing and accurate way, which can be particularly challenging for 
traumatized individuals.
156
 
Even when the court grants asylum, the asylee may have lingering 
effects of re-victimization. The asylee may find it difficult to shed the 
victim narrative after it has been reinforced during court-mandated story 
time.
157
 The creation of a victim identity that persists beyond the asylum 
claim may be a serious side effect of the victim narrative. Indeed, the 
asylum system almost requires commitment to the victim identity, as 
asylum could theoretically be revoked if country conditions change such 
that the fear of future persecution is no longer warranted.
158 
The legal 
standard thus creates a strategic ban on shedding the victim identity, even 
once asylum is officially obtained. Certain strategies, however, may help 
to combat this effect; for example, work authorization is available both for 
asylees and for some asylum applicants.
159
 Employment allows the 
applicant to obtain a professional identity, to exercise agency, and to begin 
the process of creating an ―American‖ identity.160 
Some clients may not see the victim narrative as problematic, instead 
adopting that identity more or less voluntarily. For example, the victim 
 
 
 154. See Eastmond, supra note 80, at 260.  
 155. Johansen explains: 
To be believable, stories must have narrative coherence and fidelity . . . . Simply put, stories 
need to fit into the listener‘s understanding of the way the world, or at least the world of the 
story, acts. But what stories do not have to be is true. Fiction can be believable, and the truth 
can seem implausible, or downright impossible.  
Johansen, supra note 1, at 67. 
 156. Parker, supra note 89, at 177 (―Because credible testimony is the primary basis for deciding 
some cases, such as political asylum cases, when a traumatized client has difficulty expressing 
emotion it may affect the outcome of the case.‖); see also Eastmond, supra note 80, at 259 (explaining 
possible effects of trauma, such as flat affect and monotony). 
 157. See supra text accompanying notes 142–43 (discussing the totalizing effect of narratives). 
 158. I.N.A. § 208(c)(2), 8 U.S.C. § 1158(c)(2) (2006); see also Carter & Clark, supra note 38, at 
286. Such instances, however, are rare in practice. Asylees are eligible to apply for status as a legal 
permanent resident (―LPR‖) one year after receiving asylum. I.N.A. § 209(b), 8 U.S.C. § 1159(b) 
(2006). Because of the unlikely but real possibility of losing asylee status, nearly all apply for and 
receive LPR status at the one-year mark.  
 159. I.N.A. § 209(b), 8 U.S.C. § 1159(b) (2006).  
 160. See infra note 189 (regarding the potential problems with attempts by refugees and asylees to 
assume an American identity). 
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story can serve as a remembrance that must be protected as a form of 
community identity or as a source of individual advantage.
161
 Pity is often 
preferred to suspicion, and for many immigrants in today‘s society, they 
have only these limited options from which to choose.
162
 The rest of this 
Note, however, focuses on the negative effects of such an adoption. 
B. Concerns for the Attorney 
The attorney, too, can be harmed by the persistence of the victim 
narrative throughout the asylum process. These concerns include feelings 
of insufficiency, communication barriers, burnout, secondary trauma, and 
ethical dilemmas.  
Many of the asylum applicant‘s potential problems stem from a lack of 
alternative sources of assistance. This presents the first major obstacle to 
the legal representative of the asylum applicant. Asylum applicants ideally 
find legal assistance within one year of arrival in the United States,
163
 
allowing little time to find a support system and to begin dealing with 
trauma. An applicant then comes to an attorney seeking to turn these 
traumatic experiences into a source of hope for the future. In such a 
situation, the attorney may be faced with the client‘s need for more than 
just legal assistance.
164
 Lawyers are not traditionally trained as 
therapists,
165
 but they must still be able to build trust with their client in 
order to effectively assemble the asylum application. This difficult 
situation can lead to feelings of insufficiency on the part of the attorney, 
who may feel capable in legal matters but not necessarily capable in 
addressing personal and emotional issues. While this problem is common 
to all attorneys of traumatized clients, it is particularly acute in asylum 
situations due to the high stakes of the case and the attorney‘s role in 
crafting the client‘s narrative. 
 
 
 161. Eastmond, supra note 80. 
 162. Rovner, supra note 99, at 289, 295. 
 163. This is because of the one-year standard for filing of asylum claims; an applicant must show 
changed conditions if filing more than one year after arrival in the United States. I.N.A. 
§ 208(a)(2)(B), 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a)(2)(B) (2006). 
 164. Loreen, supra note 117, at 835 (―[S]uch a client can raise many issues which cannot be 
satisfied by legal means.‖); see also Parker, supra note 89, at 169 (―The client may begin to approach 
the meetings as counseling sessions because the law student has asked for information about the 
traumatic events for purposes of preparing a declaration. . . . The law student may then assume or 
desire to assume the role of social worker and counselor.‖). 
 165. Loreen, supra note 117, at 843 (―[L]awyers lack an understanding of when or how to comfort 
a client mourning a lost relationship or contemplating death.‖). 
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The attorney faces additional problems in the area of communication, 
especially when a language barrier exists. The problem is sometimes more 
pronounced in cases in which the attorney and client must work together 
to construct a detailed narrative, such as asylum.
166
 Applicants may have 
difficulty verbalizing their trauma,
167
 and these issues are multiplied by the 
necessity of yet another stranger to interpret the client‘s story. 
Confidentiality can be a further concern with interpreters, who typically 
live in the same ethnic and geographic community as the client.
168
 
Communication difficulties lend themselves to ethical quandaries. 
When the story is unclear, there are gaps, or the timing does not make 
sense, communication failures can provide the attorney with an excuse to 
selectively hear or to shape the narrative in such a way that it is more 
likely to be successful. To some degree, this is the representative‘s duty—
to take the unpolished expression of lived experiences and turn it into a 
logical narrative that meets, whenever possible, the legal standard for 
asylum. But a lack of clarity on the client‘s part169 may lead the attorney to 
take liberty with the story or to choose whichever version of an 
inconsistent story
170
 best fits the legal goal.
171
 More subtly, it presents the 
attorney with the difficult task of maintaining the individual nature of the 
client‘s experience while at the same time molding that experience into an 
appropriate form that complies with requirements of asylum law.
172  
The attorney also must beware of the potential for secondary trauma—
a collection of adverse reactions triggered by empathetic involvement with 
 
 
 166. ―Culture influences the way one processes the world and also the way one explains the world 
to others.‖ Id. at 840. 
 167. See supra note 137. 
 168. I have worked with two clients who refused to work with interpreters from their own country. 
We had to use an interpreter from a different country despite the differences in dialect because 
confidentiality was so difficult to attain within the ethnic community in which the clients lived. 
 169. This lack of clarity is likely due to trauma in the majority of cases, but fraudulent asylum 
claims present a different sort of challenge. While most likely comprising only a small percentage of 
all asylum cases, the Dominique Strauss-Kahn scandal brought the fraud issue a great deal of media 
attention. See, e.g., Sam Dolnick, Asylum Ploys Play Off News To Open Door, N.Y. TIMES, July 12, 
2011, at A1. 
 170. While it may be tempting for the attorney to choose the best version for the written 
application and affidavit, this will likely create a weaker case if the client appears inconsistent and 
incredible when forced to provide an oral account. See supra note 55. 
 171. This is in some ways addressed by the legal standard, which requires ample corroboration of 
most aspects of an asylum claim. ―Ethical issues are acute when dealing with individuals who are not 
in a position to control the fate of their stories . . . .‖ Eastmond, supra note 80, at 261. 
 172. ―If we leave out too much, our story becomes misleading.‖ Johansen, supra note 1, at 64. 
Johansen continues, explaining how easy it is for ―storytellers to cross the line from effective and 
appropriate persuasion to inappropriate manipulation.‖ Id. 
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suffering individuals.
173
 Burnout often follows.
174
 Compassion fatigue is 
another side effect of secondary trauma,
175
 leading to a decreased ability to 
react empathetically to suffering individuals.
176
 These are well-recognized 
concerns in therapeutic communities, but many legal practitioners fail to 
account for such effects when interacting with clients who share 
traumatizing experiences. Burnout and compassion fatigue not only affect 
the lawyer but also may compromise the adequate fulfillment of 
representational duties toward the client. Burnout will interfere with the 
attorney‘s ability to engage in the many strategies available to counteract 
the victim narrative, compounding the systemic harm facing applicants.
177
 
C. Concerns for Society  
The role of narrative in asylum law has the potential to raise serious 
concerns for society as a whole. Such issues may seem more attenuated 
than the very real and immediate threats facing the client, and the similarly 
real and immediate concerns of the attorney. The power of narratives, 
however, is their ability to convey meaning beyond the place and moment 
of telling, projecting their message to a much broader audience. Asylum 
applicants live in society while their claims are being adjudicated,
178
 and 
those granted asylum carry their story with them as they become U.S. 
residents and eventually citizens. Beyond these individual narrative 
transporters, asylum stories are presented to society through other 
mediums as well, such as advocacy groups and the media. All of these 
 
 
 173. Pope & Garcia-Peltoniemi, supra note 131, at 271 (―They may experience depression, 
anxiety, or symptoms associated with posttraumatic stress disorder (e.g., intrusive thoughts, 
nightmares, unbidden images).‖).  
 174. Melissa Radey & Charles R. Figley, The Social Psychology of Compassion, 35 CLINICAL 
SOC. WORK J. 207, 207 (2007) (―Social workers take on their clients‘ problems leading to mental, 
physical, and emotional exhaustion and feelings of hopelessness and disconnection from others.‖). 
 175. Id. (―Compassion fatigue is a direct result of exposure to client suffering and complicated by 
a lack of‘support in the workplace and at home.‖). Radey and Figley continue, noting that ―[f]our 
major factors appear to contribute to compassion fatigue: poor self-care, previous unresolved trauma, 
inability or refusal to control work stressors, and a lack of satisfaction for the work.‖ Id. 
 176. Some legal scholarship does examine the effect of compassion fatigue and secondary trauma 
on attorneys, usually in the context of specific legal disciplines. See, e.g., Barbara Glesner Fines & 
Cathy Madsen, Caring Too Little, Caring Too Much: Competence and the Family Law Attorney, 75 
UMKC L. REV. 965 (2007); Andrew P. Levin, Secondary Trauma and Burnout in Attorneys: Effects of 
Work with Clients Who are Victims of Domestic Violence and Abuse, A.B.A. ENEWSLETTER, Winter 
2008, http://www.americanbar.org/newsletter/publications/cdv_enewsletter_home/expertLevin.html. 
 177. Radey & Figley, supra note 174, at 213 (―[S]elf-care should be emphasized as critical not 
only for the success and health of the practitioner, but, also, the success of clients.‖). 
 178. With the exception of those in detention, which usually requires a defensive asylum 
application. See supra note 130 (explaining defensive asylum applications). 
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outlets provide opportunities for the victim narrative to influence society, 
for better or worse. 
Cultural essentialism has been identified as one of the primary dangers 
of the victim narrative for society.
179
 The victim narrative is one of the 
primary forms in which the public encounters refugee stories.
180
 While this 
frame paints refugees in a relatively positive light,
181
 particularly in 
comparison to their ―illegal‖ immigrant counterparts, it prevents society 
from gaining a true understanding of refugees as individuals, rather than as 
a group.
182
 The asylum applicant risks tying identity to suffering,
183
 and 
society risks losing a well-rounded view of its members, instead creating 
stereotypes. This perception then erroneously perpetuates the view that 
refugees lack agency, potentially leading to paternalistic policy 
measures.
184
 
This essentialization goes beyond placing the individuals into an 
inescapable group category; it also condemns entire countries to ―enemy‖ 
status. In order to gain refugee status, the statutory standard requires 
 
 
 179.  
When news accounts like those of refugee resettlement perpetuate the stereotype of Third 
World citizens as victim subjects . . . such portrayals of victim subjects encourage cultural 
essentialism. Refugees are portrayed as victims of their culture, which ―reinforces stereotyped 
and racist representations of their culture and privileges the culture of the West.‖ Thus 
refugees are characterized only by the horrors of the national or international conflicts which 
they fled, not by the strong religious, cultural or national traditions of the lands from which 
they came. This perpetuates a sense of American superiority and refugee cultural inferiority, 
even in these seemingly positive depictions of refugees. 
Steimel, supra note 100, at 232 (quoting Ratna Kapur, The Tragedy of Victimization Rhetoric: 
Resurrecting the “Native” Subject in International/Post-Colonial Feminist Legal Polities, 15 HARV. 
HUM. RTS. J. 1, 6 (2002)). 
 180. Id. at 226 (―[T]he victim story clearly dominates as the preferred narrative for refugees 
settling in the US [sic].‖). 
 181. See supra text accompanying note 101 (noting the ability of victimhood to induce a reaction 
of pity). Not all react positively to victim narratives. Rather, many perceive asylum applicants as 
―illegals‖ who want to monopolize the country‘s resources. This attitude is particularly prevalent in 
Europe. For a study of public opinion in England, see NISSA FINNEY & ESME PEACH, ATTITUDES 
TOWARDS ASYLUM SEEKERS, REFUGEES AND OTHER IMMIGRANTS 21 (2004), available at http://www 
.icar.org.uk/asylum_icar_report.pdf (―Polls and anecdotal accounts certainly evidence a great deal of 
hostility towards asylum seekers in Britain.‖). This attitude is memorialized in the 2009 fictional work 
Little Bee. CHRIS CLEAVE, LITTLE BEE (2009). 
 182. See Eastmond, supra note 80, at 253 (warning of the ―notion of ‗the refugee experience‘ as a 
uniform condition and of the tendency to think of refugees as an undifferentiated, essentialized and 
universal category quite irrespective of the different historical and political conditions of displacement 
and of the individual differences between people who become refugees‖). 
 183. See supra notes 142–43 and accompanying text. 
 184. See Steimel, supra note 100, at 232 (―[A]t a policy level . . . the victim subject portrayal of 
Third World citizens invites protectionist remedies and responses that are not necessarily in the 
victims‘ interests . . . . [which] strips refugees of agency and hinders refugee empowerment.‖). 
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persecution somehow aided, or at least not stopped, by the government.
185
 
Both the legal process for asylum applicants and the popular portrayal of 
refugees in the media
186
 reinforce the idea that the native country is evil 
and perhaps irredeemable. Refugees and asylees lose their claim to a 
cultural identity if it is connected to the country that persecuted them.
187
 
Society, then, also loses that cultural heritage as it shuns the ―evil 
oppressor.‖188 This can place upon asylees the burden of seeking an 
American identity, which is most often achieved through financial 
success—an unlikely prospect for a newly arrived, traumatized individual 
with no previous ties to the United States.
189
  
IV. REFORMING STORY TIME: SUGGESTIONS FOR AMELIORATING THE 
EFFECTS OF THE VICTIM NARRATIVE 
Faced with these monumental philosophies of grief, mourning, and 
narrative, how are everyday practitioners—attorneys and judges—
supposed to approach their duty? Our legal system does not, and most 
likely never will, accept that truth is unattainable and that victimhood is a 
condition that cannot be fully expressed. Congress and the courts will 
continue to offer practical standards that must be attained in order to 
receive legal protection. Those standards exclude many who have suffered 
greatly. Those individuals may be deemed not credible as a result of their 
inability to effectively tell their stories. They may be forced to return to 
situations where their suffering will resume and they may even be 
killed.
190
 But the United States has practical goals and has set policies 
intended to achieve those goals. How, then, can we work within this 
framework to see that justice is done? 
 
 
 185. Regarding the standard for persecution and government involvement, see supra text 
accompanying note 45. 
 186. See generally Steimel, supra note 100. 
 187. See Elder, supra note 140, at 302. 
 188. This deprives society of the cultural appreciation that can be gained from the diversity of 
refugee experiences. Even statutory asylum law recognizes the benefit of diversity, allocating 55,000 
visas each year to immigrants from countries that are underrepresented in the United States. I.N.A. 
§ 201(e), 8 U.S.C. § 1151(e) (2006). See supra Part I.A (discussing the goals of asylum law and 
immigration regulations in general).  
 189. Steimel, supra note 100, at 233 (―[T]he very materialist assumptions of the [American] 
dream cast refugees as consumers who are not fully American if they cannot consume their way to the 
idealized American lifestyle.‖). 
 190. Examples of such dire consequences abound. See, e.g., Michele A. Voss, Young and Marked 
for Death: Expanding the Definition of “Particular Social Group” in Asylum Law to Include Youth 
Victims of Gang Persecution, 37 RUTGERS L.J. 235 (2005). 
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If the legal structure of asylum adjudication cannot be changed (which 
is debatable
191), it becomes the attorney‘s role to facilitate this impossible 
telling. Inherent in this approach are risks both to the client being forced to 
tell his or her story and to the attorney who must construct an honest, 
coherent, and logical narrative out of the likely disjunctive account relayed 
by the client. But practitioners have been seeking out workable 
relationships and solutions since asylum law began, and a number of 
solutions have been developed. The following Part outlines several 
suggestions, first for asylum applicants and attorneys, and then for society. 
These practical steps have the potential to ameliorate the negative effects 
of the victim narrative. This Part concludes with a discussion of possible 
statutory reforms. 
A. Suggestions for Asylum Applicants and Attorneys 
The attorney is the primary strategist in developing an approach that 
will minimize the effects of the victim narrative on his or her client. In 
setting the scene for story time, the attorney can take several steps to 
minimize the potential re-traumatization associated with the asylum 
process. These steps are best described by scholars working in the fields of 
Therapeutic Jurisprudence and client-centered lawyering. In addition to 
these attorney-focused strategies, this part will also examine a counter-
intuitive suggestion for minimizing the victim narrative: expanding story 
time for a more complete telling of client biography.  
1. Applied Theoretical Approaches  
Therapeutic Jurisprudence involves recognizing the consequences of 
the law and using the law to serve positive purposes for both clients and 
attorneys.
192
 Client-centered lawyering involves giving clients agency
193
 
and allowing them to be part of the solution that addresses their needs.
194
 
Both of these approaches look beyond the formalistic confines of the law 
to serve holistic needs of the client, and, in the case of Therapeutic 
Jurisprudence, the attorney as well.  
 
 
 191. For examples of possibilities for systemic change, see infra Part IV.C. 
 192. Loreen, supra note 117, at 846 (―Therapeutic Jurisprudence emphasizes the ability of the law 
to serve both clients and attorneys as a therapeutic agent by addressing law‘s therapeutic and anti-
therapeutic consequences. . . . [It is] a holistic approach to lawyering . . . .‖). 
 193. Thus preventing the stripping of the applicant‘s agency. See supra note 133. 
 194. Haynes, supra note 128. 
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The strategies associated with these movements can be employed to 
counteract the concerns of the victim narrative, particularly in the process 
of interviewing clients and constructing the affidavit. Interview questions 
must avoid further traumatization and instead help the client recount their 
experiences ―in a truthful, consistent, and detailed way . . . that avoid[s] 
unnecessary mental anguish.‖195 This is a tall order. Some strategies for 
effectively accomplishing this task include beginning every session with a 
discussion of goals, taking frequent breaks if needed, avoiding lengthy 
sessions due to the emotional drain, and taking steps to lower anxiety.
196
 
Specific interview techniques include focusing on sensory perceptions, 
permitting the client to relate details in non-chronological order,
197
 
creating a timeline,
198
 and allowing the client to communicate through 
written means, perhaps by writing in a diary.
199
 Additionally, 
commentators suggest avoiding questions that could stimulate false 
memories, particularly when seeking details.
200 
Finally, practitioners 
should address the power dynamic inherent in the attorney-client 
relationship and create safe boundaries so the client both feels and actually 
is protected. Means of accomplishing this dynamic could include using 
more neutral meeting spaces, sitting face-to-face instead of across a desk, 
or giving the client some control over the course of the meeting.
201
 
These strategies address many of the ethical issues associated with 
narrative construction. Attorneys, however, must always remain aware of 
the difficulty of balancing the need for detail with the greater likelihood 
for inconsistencies that such detail elicits.
202
 The attorney must therefore 
weigh the need for zealous advocacy,
203
 which in the case of asylum 
requires the construction of another individual‘s personal narrative, with 
 
 
 195. Suzuki, supra note 81, at 239. 
 196. Id. at 268–72. 
 197. Id. at 274 (―Varying the order of information retrieval can also assist an asylum applicant in 
recalling other details.‖). 
 198. Practitioners must, however, keep in mind that in many cultures individuals are unlikely to 
know the exact date or time. See Forester, supra note 55, at 413 (providing the example of Haitians 
who do not wear watches or know the date of events). 
 199. Id. at 273–77. 
 200. Kagan, supra note 53, at 394. 
 201. Thanks to Suzanne Brown, a practitioner of client-centered lawyering, who expressed some 
of these ideas. 
 202. See Suzuki, supra note 81, at 278 (―[T]he more details he gives, the more chances arise for 
him to be inconsistent. Inconsistencies in peripheral details may add up to a story lacking credibility in 
the eyes of the factfinder. However, testimony that is consistent but lacking in detail may also be 
viewed as not credible.‖). 
 203. MODEL RULES OF PROF‘L CONDUCT Preamble ¶ 2 (2008). 
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the absolute requirement of honesty.
204
 Open conversations with the client 
can help the attorney express both this difficulty and the client‘s 
responsibility for honesty. But, as discussed, inconsistencies are not 
necessarily indicative of dishonesty,
205
 so the attorney must take further 
care not to alienate a client by suspecting ill motives rather than the 
memory inconsistencies common to all and even more frequently found in 
traumatized individuals.
206
 
Attorneys dealing with traumatic cases must also take specific steps to 
avoid burnout. Many of the suggestions for practitioners are directed 
toward those providing therapy, rather than legal aid. But the advice is 
often equally applicable. For example, the perennial suggestion of 
adequate personal self-care (eating right, sleeping, exercising) certainly 
applies across professional boundaries.
207
 Personal self-care can be 
combined with organizational self-care, which includes limiting and 
diversifying difficult caseloads to create an environment in which burnout 
is less likely to occur.
208
  
Other suggestions call for personal self-knowledge and positive 
thinking. One clinician suggests, ―[i]n preventing compassion fatigue, 
clinicians should detect and reinforce the sense of satisfaction of working 
with the suffering.‖209 In addition, ―energy from compassion stress can 
lead instead to a sense of flourishing. To flourish, social workers 
experience the joy of helping others and find satisfaction with their 
work.‖210 This is a highly personalized quest, but it is essential for all who 
work with traumatized individuals.  
Finally, just as attorneys must seek assistance when necessary to deal 
with the effects of their caseloads, they also must recognize when the 
client needs more than just legal services. Some asylum applicants may 
shun the idea of mental health services because of cultural taboos.
211
 But 
the availability of free or low-cost services is a way for many attorneys to 
 
 
 204. Id. R. 8.4(c) (requiring that a lawyer shall not engage in any dishonest conduct). 
 205. See supra note 93. 
 206. See supra notes 136–37 and accompanying text (discussing the effect of trauma on a victim‘s 
ability to accurately recall traumatic events). 
 207. Suzuki, supra note 81, at 210. 
 208. Id. 
 209. See Radey & Figley, supra note 174, at 207. 
 210. Id. at 208. Lawyers may need to approach this strategy differently from therapists. Lawyers, 
for example, have an objective measure of success in the disposition of the asylum application. Thus, 
lawyers may need additional strategies to cope with those situations in which an application is denied. 
 211. See Loes H. M. van Willigen, Broken Spirits: The Treatment of Traumatized Asylum Seekers, 
Refugees, War and Torture Victims, 19 J. REFUGEE STUD. 133 (2006) (reviewing BROKEN SPIRITS: 
THE TREATMENT OF TRAUMATIZED ASYLUM SEEKERS, REFUGEES, WAR AND TORTURE VICTIMS 
(John P. Wilson & Boris Drožđek eds., 2004)). 
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establish appropriate boundaries in the attorney-client relationship and at 
the same time ensure that the client‘s holistic needs are met. In some 
cities, this is accomplished through collaborative partnerships between 
non-profit legal organizations, mental health providers, and case 
management services.
212
 Access to such services gives asylum applicants a 
forum in which they can seek help in dealing with the effects of the victim 
narrative in which they are immersed during the asylum process. 
2. Expanding Story Time 
Many asylum applicants also benefit from having the opportunity to 
tell their story, however difficult it may be for the lawyer to listen.
213
 
Silence is a frequent coping mechanism for those who have suffered 
trauma.
214
 But many individuals find that an oral narrative serves many 
purposes in the recovery process. First, the telling may be a ―reaffirmation 
of self‖—a way of individualizing an experience that has been or will be 
essentialized.
215
 Second, many find that voicing their story is a way of 
bearing witness to loss and injustice, with the hope that such testimony 
will bring about awareness and change.
216
 But this altruistic goal 
occasionally conflicts with the personal need for healing as the act of 
bearing witness can be painful, particularly when done in a public 
forum.
217
  
 
 
 212. During the summer of 2010, I worked with such a collaborative organized under Care Access 
for New Americans. The collaborative, located in St. Louis, received a grant through which clients 
were shared among four agencies providing legal services, mental health services, case management, 
and English tutoring. 
 213. See Pope & Garcia-Peltoniemi, supra note 131, at 273 (―Personal testimony may be an 
exceptionally healing experience for many victims of torture.‖).  
 214. Eastmond, supra note 80, at 259 (―Some survivors remain silent because they need to 
dissociate themselves from painful memories or fear that their stories will not be believed, or be 
bearable to the listener . . . .‖ (internal citation omitted)). 
 215. Id. at 254. Of course, while this serves the purpose of de-essentializing the experience, it 
certainly does not help the client move beyond their victim narrative. But the victim narrative is part of 
who the asylum applicant is; the goal is not to strip applicants of that facet of their experience but to 
minimize its harmful effects. Telling and coping with that narrative is often the first step towards 
recovery. ―Thus, stories are important sites not only for negotiating what has happened and what it 
means, but also for seeking ways of going forward.‖ Id. at 251. 
 216. Id. at 258 (―‗[Some] men and women wanted their lives to bear witness to the wrongs that 
they had experienced and to the injustices of history.‘‖ (quoting Vieda Skultans, Weaving New Lives 
from an Old Fleece: Gender and Ethnicity in Latvian Narrative, in ETHNICITY, GENDER, AND SOCIAL 
CHANGE 169 (Rohit Barot et al. eds., 1999)).  
 217. For many who choose to tell their story, ―it [is] a struggle between the moral imperative not 
to forget and the extreme pain of remembering.‖ Id. at 259. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol89/iss6/10
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Nonetheless, public tellings in particular can help establish a 
community identity.
218
 The danger of cultural stripping associated with 
antagonizing the home country makes this aspect of national identity 
especially important for many displaced individuals.
219
 When the narrative 
is shared with others in the community, it becomes a source of hope and 
inner strength.
220
 
Some asylum applicants have no community once displaced. Others 
have extremely sensitive details that cannot be shared with the public, 
perhaps because of ongoing security concerns, family and friends left 
behind,
221
 or legal strategy.
222
 For these individuals, a feeling of ―exile‖ 
might make this inability to tell their story a further impediment to 
recovery.
223
 In such cases, telling the story to an attorney and government 
adjudicator may be a way to accomplish healing, rather than further harm, 
particularly when properly facilitated by the listeners. 
Many of these suggestions center on ways in which a narrative of 
suffering can be useful for an asylum applicant. There are, however, many 
difficulties in the telling of a victim narrative. And even when it can be 
therapeutic, the attorney‘s office is not always the place where that healing 
will take place. But for some clients, there is a need to tell more than just 
the victim narrative. Placing suffering in the context of an entire life story 
can be highly beneficial. For some asylum applicants, having a safe setting 
in which to wax eloquent about unrelated details and other important life 
events can help them to narrow their focus to the persecution in the asylum 
claim itself.
224
 The need to present a perfect victim in the asylum 
application conflicts with the desire to share an extended life story with all 
of its messy details. But allowing a more extended telling in an unrelated 
 
 
 218. ―When testimony is communal in nature, it can help counter the victims‘ sense of being 
overwhelmed by a powerful communal force.‖ Pope & Garcia-Peltoniemi, supra note 131, at 273. 
 219. Eastmond, supra note 80, at 258 (―[T]heir stories . . . served to forge a sense of collective 
identity and survival as a nation . . . .‖). 
 220. Id. at 251 (―Story-telling in itself, as a way for individuals and communities to remember, 
bear witness, or seek to restore continuity and identity, can be a symbolic resource enlisted to alleviate 
suffering and change their situation.‖). 
 221. I worked with such a client during a summer internship. Although she had already received 
asylum, some of her family members had not yet reached safety. As a result, confidentiality remained 
of the utmost importance. 
 222. Attorneys should also be aware of the potential danger of voiding the attorney-client 
privilege with public narrative tellings. 
 223. Eastmond, supra note 80, at 252 (―Suffering became meaningless as it became socially 
invisible and, instead of being a source of self-esteem and agency, it subsequently manifested as 
illness and depression.‖). 
 224. Id. 
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setting can aid the client who wishes to avoid the need to limit identity to 
suffering in the legal storybook. 
Beyond modifications in forum and format for the telling of lived 
experience, some clients might benefit from efforts at redefinition. For 
those denied asylum, this will be a self-initiated and necessary process for 
survival—redefining their identity in a manner that will not attract 
persecution. For those granted asylum, the government and society at large 
will benefit from providing such opportunities. The citizenship process, 
for example, provides opportunities for asylees to find a new identity in 
American citizenship.
225
 
B. Strategies for Society  
Ideas for galvanizing society as a whole to take steps to prevent the 
unrecognized harm of essentialization and stereotyping clearly falls into 
the realm of academic palaver. But certain key players within society do 
have a central role in shaping public opinion and relaying victim narratives 
to a wider audience. Journalists are one source through which the stories 
are publicized;
226
 many non-governmental organizations and religious 
organizations also play a role.
227
 For these professionals, recognition of the 
problems with victim narratives can pave the way for the use of coping 
strategies that limit the damage of such limited narratives and instead open 
the way to a more diverse discourse.  
The first strategy is straightforward: do not stop with the victim 
narrative. Seek out the entire story. Asylum applicants may be encouraged 
to share a more complete life history, including details of their life 
successes and accomplishments, as a way of de-essentializing their own 
experience.
228
 Listeners can then take the suffering, which is perhaps the 
―hook‖ in the story, and place it in a more complex context that better 
accounts for the varied life circumstances that describe the individual as a 
whole. This process forces the listener to move beyond stereotypes and to 
reflect on an entire individual instead of a character-type. It also helps 
society recognize the potential contributions of refugees and asylees to 
 
 
 225. See Geri Smyth et al., Introduction: Critical Reflections on Refugee Integration: Lessons 
from International Perspectives, 23 J. REFUGEE STUD. 411, 412 (2010) (―The role assigned to 
citizenship in the integration process also raises issues pertaining to identity and belonging . . . .‖). 
 226. See generally Steimel, supra note 100. 
 227. See, e.g., JUST. FOR IMMIGRANTS, http://www.justiceforimmigrants.org (last visited May 19, 
2012); AM. IMMIGR. COUNCIL, http://www.americanimmigrationcouncil.org (last visited May 19, 
2012); FED‘N FOR AM. IMMIGR. REFORM, http://www.fairus.org (last visited May 19, 2012). 
 228. See supra text accompanying note 179. 
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their new homelands: benefiting, rather than burdening, society with their 
presence.
229
 
Such expanded stories are necessarily less ―catchy‖—they cannot be 
told in a paragraph. Victim narratives are effective because they fit within 
a recognized narrative form that appeals to a listener‘s sense of form and 
order.
230
 But a complete story ―can promote a greater appreciation of the 
diversity of experience involved in forced migration, against 
universalizing and stereotypical descriptions of what it means to be a 
‗refugee‘.‖231 In the broader effort to subvert stereotypes, such efforts may 
even humanize political discourses concerning immigration as a whole by 
introducing a greater understanding of individualized experiences and 
social forces in place of stock characters and political sound bites.  
In addition to expanding individual stories, society needs to hear more 
stories. This serves to broaden the stereotype, rather than narrowing it to 
the experiences of a single individual: ―[f]rom personal accounts we may 
also glean the diversity behind over-generalized notions of ‗the refugee 
experience‘.‖232 Recognizing diversity is not a strong point of asylum law, 
making it unlikely that society will spontaneously develop such an 
understanding. But by hearing a broad range of experiences and stories, 
members of society can see asylees as a diverse group, perhaps eventually 
encouraging changes in the legal system from the ground up.  
C. Statutory Reforms 
Political realities make comprehensive reform elusive,
233
 heightening 
the importance of the practical suggestions discussed infra. Nonetheless, 
change that reduces the harmful effects to applicants and still preserves the 
 
 
 229. Thanks to Professor Legomsky for this insight.  
 230. See Eastmond, supra note 80, at 250.  
 231. Id. at 253. 
 232. Id. at 249. 
 233. The Republican Party, traditionally known for more restrictionist immigration sentiments, 
gained control of the House of Representatives in the 2010 elections. Nonetheless, President Obama 
continued to call for comprehensive immigration reform in his 2011 State of the Union Address, 
leaving some activists with hope that change might still be on the horizon. President Barack Obama, 
Remarks by the President in State of Union Address (Jan. 25, 2011), available at http://www 
.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/remarks-president-state-union-address. The administration began 
implementing some reforms through administrative channels, including changes to the standard for 
prosecutorial discretion, see supra note 8, and new regulations allowing in-country processing of 
family unity waivers. USCIS to Propose Changing the Process for Certain Waivers, U.S. CITIZENSHIP 
AND IMMIGR. SERVS. (Feb. 22, 2012), http://www.uscis.gov/portal/site/uscis/menuitem.5af9bb95919 
f35e66f614176543f6d1a/?vgnextoid=95356a0d87aa4310VgnVCM100000082ca60aRCRD&vgnextch
annel=8a2f6d26d17df110VgnVCM1000004718190aRCRD. 
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goals of the U.S. asylum system is possible. The following section 
addresses those suggestions most likely to alleviate the negative impact of 
the victim narrative in asylum applications. These suggestions focus on the 
application process and objective judicial standards.
234
 
Many of the problems with the asylum system stem from a lack of 
sensitivity towards the extreme suffering—both past and present—
experienced by applicants.
235
 One of the ways in which the asylum process 
accentuates this difficulty is by imposing a one-year deadline for 
affirmative
236
 applications for asylum.
237
 Eliminating the one-year 
deadline could specifically address the issue of the victim narrative by 
 
 
 234. Reforming the procedures associated with credibility determinations is another area in which 
numerous suggestions have been made for reform. As previously discussed, credibility determinations 
present particular difficulty to traumatized clients and have the potential to negatively affect self-
identity. The scope of these proposals is outside the reach of this Note. One commentator, however, 
summarized the proposed reforms, which include 
using objective criteria, considering trauma-related symptoms, requiring a rebuttable 
presumption of credibility of political asylum applicants on due process grounds, or adopting 
a ‗benefit of the doubt‘ standard because of the emphasis on testimony and the lack of 
corroborating evidence when an individual flees his home country with little or no 
documentation. 
Suzuki, supra note 81, at 240 (footnotes omitted); see also Kagan, supra note 53. 
 235. United States Citizenship and Immigration Services perhaps recognizes such criticisms. 
Officers undergo several areas of sensitivity training, including lessons on interviewing survivors of 
torture and cross-cultural communication. See, e.g., U.S. CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGRATION SERVICES, 
Interviewing Part V: Interviewing Survivors, in PARTICIPANT HANDBOOK (2004), available at 
http://www.uscis.gov/USCIS/Humanitarian/Refugees%20&%20Asylum/Asylum/AOBTC%20Lesson
%20Plans/Interview-Part5-Interviewing-Survivors31aug10.pdf; U.S. CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGRATION 
SERVICES, Interviewing Part IV: Inter-Cultural Communication and Other Factors That May Impede 
Communication at an Asylum Interview, in PARTICIPANT HANDBOOK (2002), available at 
http://www.uscis.gov/USCIS/Humanitarian/Refugees%20&%20Asylum/Asylum/AOBTC%20Lesson
%20Plans/Interview-Part4-Intercultural-Communication-31aug10.pdf. In addition to the potential lack 
of human sensitivity, the system itself lacks sensitivity, as will be explored infra.  
 236. See supra note 130 (discussing the differences between affirmative and defensive 
applications for asylum). 
 237. I.N.A. § 208(a)(2)(B), 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a)(2)(B) (2006). For a critique of the one-year 
deadline, see HEARTLAND ALLIANCE NAT‘L IMMIGRATION JUSTICE CTR. ET AL., THE ONE-YEAR 
ASYLUM DEADLINE AND THE BIA: NO PROTECTION, NO PROCESS 2 (2010) [hereinafter HEARTLAND 
ALLIANCE], available at http://www.humanrightsfirst.org/wp-content/uploads/pdf/1YD-report-FULL 
.pdf (―The one-year deadline threatens the U.S. government‘s fundamental moral and legal 
commitment to protect refugees. Legal experts conclude that the filing deadline results in the arbitrary 
denial of protection to refugees.‖). 
 Similar deadlines exist for other immigration benefits. For example, applications for family 
reunification for refugees must be filed within two years of the principal applicant‘s arrival in the 
United States. 8 C.F.R. § 207.7(d) (2011). The regulations were originally written to impose a one-
year deadline, but concerns raised during comment period persuaded the Immigration and 
Naturalization Service to extend the deadline to two years. See Procedures for Filing a Derivative 
Petition (Form I-730) for a Spouse and Unmarried Children of a Refugee/Asylee, 63 Fed. Reg. 3792 
(Jan. 27, 1998) (responding to comments opposing a one-year deadline and amending to a two-year 
deadline for refugee family reunification petitions). 
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eliminating an artificial pressure. Traumatized asylum applicants would 
have extra time to address psychological and emotional needs before 
rehashing their experiences in court. Appropriate care could help asylum 
applicants re-establish an identity distinct from their suffering, and they 
could then tell their stories without essentializing themselves and being 
defined by a moment of persecution. It would also eliminate the 
arbitrariness of asylum decisions based not on the legal standard, but on a 
procedural requirement.
238
 
An additional source of dissatisfaction with the asylum system stems 
from the substantial disparities in judicial decision-making.
239
 This 
particular area offers a counterpoint to the idea that lawyers control their 
clients‘ cases through the shaping of various narratives; the final outcome 
might be more related to individual decision-making standards and 
personal ideologies than to a comprehensible system of law.
240
 
Suggestions for improving judicial decision-making focus on setting more 
objective standards and improving training, particularly related to cultural 
sensitivity.
241
  
None of these suggestions will eliminate the need to rely on a victim 
narrative in crafting a successful asylum application. But they are possible 
coping methods that can alleviate the harmful effects of the human need 
for recognizable characters and stories. On another level, they allow the 
legal system to be flexible in the application of its formal standard to 
individual, real-life people. Even assuming that legislative changes will 
not be forthcoming in the near future, options exist for working towards 
the goal of providing holistic relief, rather than merely providing limited 
legal relief in the form of asylum, to the tired and poor who make their 
way to America‘s shores.242 
 
 
 238. A 2010 report points out that the one-year deadline resulted in denials ―on the basis of a 
technicality.‖ HEARTLAND ALLIANCE, supra note 237, at 3. It offered the following suggestions for the 
administrative agencies to address the issue even before the deadline is repealed: ―DOJ and DHS 
should revisit regulations governing exceptions to the deadline, create additional training materials and 
guidance on the deadline, issue precedential decisions interpreting the deadline . . . and monitor the 
adjudication of asylum cases involving the deadline.‖ Id. 
 239. Stephen H. Legomsky, Learning to Live with Unequal Justice: Asylum and the Limits to 
Consistency, 60 STAN. L. REV. 413, 415 (2007) (―[A]sylum outcomes often depend as much on the 
luck of the draw as on the merits of the case.‖).  
 240. Of course, zealous legal advocacy does not allow a prudent practitioner to accept that the 
outcome is out of her control; indeed, while their standards may vary, even the harshest judge is surely 
influenced by the strength of the applicant‘s claim and preparation.  
 241. Legomsky, supra note 239, at 444–57. 
 242. ―Give me your tired, your poor/Your huddled masses yearning to breathe free.‖ EMMA 
LAZARUS, THE NEW COLOSSUS (1883). 
Washington University Open Scholarship
  
 
 
 
 
1522 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [VOL. 89:1485 
 
 
 
 
V. CONCLUSION: ASYLUM AND THE STORIES AMERICA TELLS 
Immigration is one of the most hotly contested political issues today, 
but a true understanding of the immigration system and its many facets 
eludes most involved in the debate. Political narratives focus on emotional 
appeals rather than detailed analysis and thoughtful suggestions for 
reform. This Note has suggested that this polarization could be 
ameliorated by a deeper consideration of the existing black-letter law and 
the human stories that color its pages. Asylum is an often-overlooked 
aspect of U.S. immigration law that holds promise for a greater 
appreciation of immigrants and their stories. But the asylum process is rife 
with obstacles, and its narrow focus on the victim narrative impedes a 
broader societal appreciation for the courageous stories of those navigating 
the asylum process. By putting into practice the suggestions explored in 
this Note, an expanded narrative vision may emerge. The resulting stories 
may provide a glimmer of common ground on which America can build a 
reformed immigration system that continues her venerable tradition of 
welcoming the foreigner. 
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